The Effect of Hubert Dreyfus’s Epistemological Assumption on the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence

Abstract

AbstractHubert Dreyfus is one of the professionals who has done some research on epistemology in the field of artificial intelligence research. He made an epistemological assumption in the field of artificial intelligence. As artificial intelligence develops, it becomes more connected to the field of knowledge. In the field of knowledge, the more you will connect with the field of philosophy that emphasizes knowledge. In this paper, we examines the epistemological assumption in the philosophy of artificial intelligence and attempts to identify some key questions. The purpose of this paper is to provide a close, detailed analysis of the frequency, nature, and depth of visible use in an epistemological assumption and artificial intelligence of Hubert Dreyfus’s early works “What computers can’t do”. This research investigates the trend as the consequences of the epistemology assumption concerns and experiment of epistemology assumption experience are analyzed. The results show that contrary to initial expectations, the epistemology assumption related works in question are relatively little used by AI scholars in journal articles, and where they are used, such use is often only vague, brief, or in passing. The need to intensify human-centred research in artificial intelligence research is clear from Hubert Dreyfus’s epistemological assumption. Furthermore, in order to develop artificial intelligence, it is necessary to develop brain function and physical body interaction together.KeywordsArtificial intelligenceHuman-computer interactionPhilosophyEpistemology