Abstract
PurposeThis paper aims to examine different hypotheses concerning the effects of executive incentive on the degree of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) ambidexterity. Specifically, this study provides new insights on how executive equity incentive and executive control right incentive may affect overseas ambidextrous strategy of Chinese enterprises.Design/methodology/approachThis study used panel data of Chinese manufacturing listed companies in 2006-2015 to explore the relationships between related factors. Hypotheses are tested by using regression analysis.FindingsThis study found that executive equity incentive is positively related to the degree of FDI ambidexterity. It also found that the level at which control right incentives of executive are made has a curvilinear relationship with degree of FDI ambidexterity. Higher level of control right incentive of executive will be associated with higher degree of FDI ambidexterity; however, beyond some level, higher control right incentive of executive will be associated with lower degree of FDI ambidexterity.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper has implications to future research and companies’ everyday practice on ambidextrous FDI strategy.Originality/valueBased on the principal-agent framework and incentive theory, this paper offers an interesting insight of achieving balance of ambidextrous strategy for Chinese multinational enterprises by involving the different roles of executive equity incentive and executive control right incentive they played.
Published Version
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