Abstract
The water resource pollution in China is very serious, and as a kind of public goods, water resource is easy to cause "free riding" behavior in the process of consumption. How to eliminate the interest conflict between different economic subjects? Environmental administrative punishment is one of the answers. This measure based on the Pigou theory is the foundation of Chinas environmental governance. From the perspective of game theory, this paper analyzes the effect of administrative punishment means of the water resources environment by constructing and analyzing the game theory model and concludes: that the unreasonable setting of the administrative punishment system for the water resources environment and the incomplete implementation process make its effect poor. Finally, the paper puts forward improvement suggestions from three aspects: strengthening supervision, system innovation and the application of Coase theory.
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