Power game and mathematical model improvement of urban public works evaluation

Abstract

As an important tool of urban public works evaluation and a result of redistribution of public interests and private interests after power game between each evaluating subject of urban public works, it focus on comprehensive evaluation of urban public works benefits. Owing to complicated relations of each evaluating subject' interests of urban public works and unequal power positions of each subject, a game between groups of high power positions and that of low power positions occurs and results in distorting behavior of urban public works evaluation so that urban public works supply is lacked or excess meanwhile urban public interest is eroded. This paper suggests that some institutional evaluating indexes should be added into the current normal indexes of urban public works evaluation from the perspective of game theory; and points out that mathematical evaluating model of urban public works could be improved based on those new evaluating indexes, consequently, bias conclusion of urban public works evaluation caused by the power game could be corrected. The innovation of this paper is that it attempts to evaluating urban public works from the perspective of power game theory, and then to design some new evaluating indicators of evaluating institutions of urban public works, and finally to establish a better mathematical evaluation model.