The Effect of Corporate Governance on the Degree of Agency Cost in the Korean Market

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between corporate governance (CG) and agency costs using Korean market data, particularly for chaebol firms. The final sample includes 660 firm-year observations between 2016 and 2020 for Korean non-financial firms listed on the Korean Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI). This study employs an ordinary least-squares panel data regression model using two proxies for agency costs, namely, asset utilization ratio and operating expense ratio, and six CG individual metrics as independent variables (CG score, protection of shareholder rights, board structure, disclosure, audit organization, and managerial discretion and error management). We find that firms with high CG experience lower agency costs than those with low CG. Moreover, our evidence suggests that firms can decrease agency costs by improving the quality of CG. The results of our regression model also support the idea that CG is effective in reducing agency costs for chaebol firms but not for non-chaebol firms. Finally, our findings suggest that the implementation of effective CG mechanisms in firms might improve managerial behavior through better decision-making to maximize the value of firms.