Abstract

Economic and political phenomena coexist in society, but are often seen as divergent spheres of human action and interaction. A theoretical manifestation of this separation is the assumption that while economic agents act in their own self-interest, political agents are motivated by the public interest. Additionally, it is commonly assumed – if only implicitly – that political agents possess all the necessary knowledge for rational action, effectively portraying political agents as omniscient beings. Drawing on public choice theory and on the economic literature on the nature of knowledge, we review arguments that challenge the two assumptions.

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.