The dynamic evolution mechanism of interest groups and its stable strategy based on policy-oriented of mountainous towns

Abstract

In this context, the pilot project is by adjusting the interest of the parties achieve the sustainable use of ecosystem services as a means or institutional arrangements. Methods: the mountain town interest groups are divided into implementation group and accept the group create an asymmetric evolutionary game model analyze the stability of the replicator dynamics of the relationship between the interests of different groups, evolutionary stable strategies and evolutionary game system. Results: in the case of Report punishment system exists, evolutionary game between the two populations exist only stable equilibrium strategy (protection, compensation), that is, the implementation of group to the gentle slope development strategy, accept group selection differences in compensation policy, form a stable equilibrium strategy. Conclusion: Report punishment expand the scope and extent of the traditional concept of punishment; stability of the system is only relevant the implementation of group decision-making; proportion of decision-making is an important factor promote a stable equilibrium strategy.