Evolutionary Game of Pesticide Reduction Management for Sustainable Agriculture: An Analysis Based on Local Governments, Farmers, and Consumers

Abstract

Promoting pesticide reduction is a critical component of achieving sustainable agriculture. However, the challenges involved in coordinating diverse stakeholder demands pose difficulties in promoting pesticide reduction behavior. To reveal the evolutionary paths of the decision-making processes of each player under various influencing factors and optimize pesticide reduction policies, this paper proposes a three-way evolutionary game model that considers the interests of the local governments, farmers, and consumers. The study reveals six stable equilibrium strategies in the evolutionary game system of pesticide reduction for sustainable agriculture (SA). Under polycentric governance, ideal states allow local governments to regulate farmers’ pesticide reduction and consumers’ purchases of green agricultural products. Regulatory measures such as providing technical and in-kind subsidies for pesticide reduction, imposing penalties for the overuse of pesticides, and promoting public awareness influence farmers’ and consumers’ decisions when it comes to reducing pesticides and purchasing green produce. Moreover, the total benefits of pesticide reduction for farmers and the utility of green produce consumption for consumers are primary factors that influence the evolutionary game system’s eventual evolution toward different stable equilibrium strategies. These factors primarily affect the supply and demand of green products, which in turn impacts pesticide reduction. This study enhances the policy analysis of pesticide reduction and provides valuable insights into constructing a pesticide reduction policy system based on polycentric governance.