The dispensable nation: American foreign policy in retreat, by Vali Nasr

Abstract

Vali Nasr The dispensable nation: American foreign policy in retreat New York: Doubleday, 2013. 300pp $34.00 (cloth) ISBN: 978-0385536479America's global leadership, once thought by some to be visionary and purposeful, is now in decline, most observably in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the wider Middle East. A key reason for this decline is the omnipresence of political operatives in the Obama White House; former campaign strategists decide foreign policy based upon crude political calculations. The expert advice of senior foreign policy advi- sors is subverted to the interests of plays best on the evening news.Vali Nasr was senior adviser to President Barack Obama's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, from 2009 2010. His book scathingly accuses the Obama administration of sacrificing long-term national interests in favour of short-term political gains, with grave consequences for American power. The book is an indictment of the administration's mismanagement of foreign policy in the high-stakes post-9/11 world, especially with respect to relations with the Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China.While Obama has received some praise for his foreign policy record, this is chiefly because his team aims to satisfy public opinion first, leaving the difficult strategic calculations about America's long-term interests for his successors. A consequence of allowing political strategists to make foreign policy is that America's official position on a host of issues is to take no position at all. Senior members of the foreign policy establishment have been asked to communicate stunningly obtuse proposals to our allies (3), themselves unconvinced of the wisdom of their actions. Nasr suggests that the White House's treatment of the Department of State, and of Holbrooke, illustrate this point.Apparently the State Department fought to be included in foreign policy decisions. That it participated at all is ow>ed to Hillary Clinton's stature as secretary of state. Holbrooke reportedly had to fight tooth and nail to be heard on AfPak policy, despite his position as special representative. In the face of Holbrooke's advice on this file, Obama's advisers dithered on whether force or diplomacy would best end the war in Afghanistan and wound up choosing neither. This insouciance is visible in other foreign policy files: if they kicked the can down the road long enough, they could avoid public scrutiny, and avoid decisions altogether hoping things would resolve themselves. Not did this approach do nothing to make America safer, but also, Nasr argues, it further put American security at risk, failed to end the war in Afghanistan, and raised serious questions about American leadership.In addition to these failures is the administration's underestimation of Pakistan's importance to the Afghanistan effort. Nasr writes that the troop surge that Obama reluctantly approved would have been useful to assist Pakistan in pressuring the Taliban. This opportunity was missed, as were others, such as chances to address the public outcry in Pakistan over the US drone program and to find alternatives to the pressure only policies with Pakistan and Iran that were clearly not yielding results. On Iran, Nasr convincingly argues that sanctions were the most favoured option precisely because they are what you do when you cannot or will not do anything else (110). American inaction has left relations with both countries unresolved.Moreover, America's hasty exit from Iraq left fertile ground for violent sectarianism. Nasr likens this sectarianism, similar to that which has flourished after the Arab Spring, to a rising storm. The unravelling of American efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the wider Middle East are major vulnerabilities for America. Nasr posits that the combination of weakened regimes, sectarian urges and great power ineptitude have opened the gates to ethnic cleansing, floods of refugees, humanitarian disasters and conditions ripe for al Qaeda to flourish regionally. …