The (Dis)continuity of Philosophy: Reflections on Susan Haack’s Critical Common-Sensism

Abstract

The focus of our paper is the conceptual backbone of Susan Haack’s metascientific considerations: the Peirce-inspired “Common-sensist Continuum”, which Haack introduces in order to develop an epistemology of science that, while admitting that there are objective epistemic standards, abandons the idea that science can be characterized by a unique logical or quasi-logical method. As such, Haack’s position can be understood as a middle-course approach between what she calls “Old Deferentialism” and “New Cynicism”. Critical Common-sensism offers an intuitively plausible description of the interrelations of the various scientific inquires. It does not only consider the sciences as being continuous with common place forms of human inquiry, it deals with a term of “science” that reaches beyond the spectrum of the natural sciences, incorporating the social sciences and philosophy, as well. We will argue, however, that it leaves some important questions unanswered. These questions especially concern the role of philosophy within the scientific continuum.