Abstract
Proponents of ontic conceptions of explanation require all explanations to be backed by causal, constitutive, or similar relations. Among their justifications is that only ontic conceptions can do justice to the ‘directionality’ of explanation, i.e., the requirement that if X explains Y, then not-Y does not explain not-X. Using topological explanations as an illustration, we argue that non-ontic conceptions of explanation have ample resources for securing the directionality of explanations. The different ways in which neuroscientists rely on multiplexes involving both functional and anatomical connectivity in their topological explanations vividly illustrate why ontic considerations are frequently (if not always) irrelevant to explanatory directionality. Therefore, directionality poses no problem to non-ontic conceptions of explanation.
Highlights
Philosophical discussions about scientific explanation are guided by two powerful intuitions
Scientific explanations have greater resources to block directionality problems than the Königsberg example suggests. It is in this context that topological explanations in neuroscience which appeal to multiplexes of functional connectivity (FC) and anatomical connectivity (AC) provide an especially fertile set of cases for evaluating solutions to the directionality problem
When one speaks abstractly of “non-ontic conceptions of explanation” and only considers examples that seem better-suited for mathematics textbooks than for science journals, the directionality problem appears quite formidable
Summary
Philosophical discussions about scientific explanation are guided by two powerful intuitions. Synthese them neatly onto the dependency relations that make up its worldly structure In such cases, explanations seem to work without an ontological net. Explanations seem to work without an ontological net In response to these cases, so-called ontic theorists hold fast to the first intuition and provide a litany of challenges to those who wander from their flock. This is especially clear in discussions of so-called topological or “network” explanations. 3), paired with examples more reflective of scientific practice, reveals that an overwhelming number of topological explanations in science exhibit the required directionality without appeals to any ontic dependence relations We conclude that those who distance themselves from ontic conceptions of explanation have ample resources for addressing the most serious of directionality problems
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