Origins of biological teleology: how constraints represent ends

Abstract

To naturalize the concept of teleological causality in biology it is not enough to avoid assuming backward causation or positing the existence of an inscrutable teleological essence like the élan vital. We must also specify how the causality of organisms is distinct from the causality of designed artifacts like thermostats or asymmetrically oriented processes like the ubiquitous increase of entropy. Historically, the concept of teleological causality in biology has been based on an analogy to the familiar experience of purposeful action. This is experienced by us as a disposition to achieve a general type of end that is represented in advance, and which regulates the selection of efficient means to achieve it. Inspired by this analogy, to bridge the gap between biology and human agency we describe a simple molecular process called autogenesis that shows how two linked complementary self-organizing processes can give rise to higher-order relations that resemble purposeful dispositions, though expressed in terms of constraints on molecular processes. Because the autogenic model is described in sufficient detail to be empirically realizable, it provides a proof of principle demonstrating a simple form of teleological causality.