The dialectics of affective and conceptual thought

Abstract

This paper considers the lack of coherence of the psychoanalytic theories of the primary and secondary process. As a consequence, the interplay of primary and secondary process modes of thought cannot be conceptualised properly. Firstly, we summarize the results of an elsewhere-made metapsychological re-examination of both principles of mental functioning, and argue that Rapaport's distinction between a drive and a conceptual organization of memory, elaborated on by Siegfried Zepf is an extremely useful means of understanding primary and secondary process activity. As a central thesis, we state that primary process operates by affects, whilst secondary process utilizes concepts. The second part of the paper makes an attempt to show the dialectical relationship of affective and conceptual thought in the functioning of the living psyche. Temporarily dominating mental functioning, primary and secondary process thinking each utilize the other as a means, but never work purely within the psychic apparatus. It is shown that it is the specific interplay of primary and secondary process activity, which produces new adaptive substitutive formations. Some basic assumptions about the concepts of regression and progression are made to elucidate the shift from secondary to primary process dominance and vice versa.