Abstract
The aim of this article is to examine the development Wittgenstein undergoes between 1929 (the year of his return to Cambridge) and 1951 (the year of his death) in his approach to the other minds problem. Wittgenstein’s way of dealing with this problem is in terms of an analysis of the use of psychological concepts in the third person. However, in contrast to his extensive treatment of psychological concepts in the first person in Philosophical Investigations (PI) and other posthumously published works, he remains rather reticent about the correct analysis of third-person attributions of sensations, emotions and thoughts. Therefore it comes as no surprise that the little that has been written about this aspect of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mind is controversial. For instance, some commentators deny that Wittgenstein was ever a behaviourist and even try to explain away the apparent behaviourism in Philosophical Remarks (PR). Others, instead, read Wittgenstein as a behaviourist even in his later works. According to R. Fogelin, for instance, Wittgenstein takes it for granted in Zettel par. 488 that the third person employment of psychological concepts simply give information that can be verified by observation and the position he ascribes to Wittgenstein is “straightforwardly behaviouristic”.1
Published Version
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