Abstract
Since the 1990s, sanctions senders like the European Union, the United States, and the United Nations have been imposing visa bans and asset freezes on individuals as a key element of their sanctions packages. Notwithstanding the growing centrality that individual sanctions have acquired in international sanctions practice, little is known about the impact of sanctions listings on designees. Some researchers have scrutinised targeting choices, while others have explored the effects of sanctions on designees. However, no study has yet examined the fit between targeting choices and impacts on designees. First, we interrogate the theory of targeted sanctions to identify the expectations that it generates. Second, we examine the effects on designees and contrast them with the targeting logic of the sender, in a bid to ascertain their fit. Our analysis of the cases of Côte d’Ivoire (2010–2011) and Zimbabwe (2002–2017) benefits from original interview material.
Highlights
IntroductionI.e., travel bans and asset freezes, have become a regular feature of the inter‐ national sanctions practice of most senders, including the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the United States (US) and the European Union (EU)
Sanctions against individuals, i.e., travel bans and asset freezes, have become a regular feature of the inter‐ national sanctions practice of most senders, including the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the United States (US) and the European Union (EU)
Their microanalysis hinted at anecdotal evidence of a mismatch between the design of targeted sanctions and their actual impact in the field: Illustratively, their research revealed that a 2004 United Nations (UN) blacklist was mocked locally for featuring only three designees who were viewed as peripheral in terms of political power
Summary
I.e., travel bans and asset freezes, have become a regular feature of the inter‐ national sanctions practice of most senders, including the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). Indications are that anticipated and actual effects on individuals diverge In their microanalysis of targeting choices by the UNSC, Wallensteen and Grusell (2012) found that most targets were mid‐ranking officials, private facilita‐ tors, or “middlemen” rather than leaders. Most impor‐ tantly, they concluded that designation tactics reflected a weak understanding of how individual sanctions would be perceived, which undermined the credibil‐ ity of the sanctions. Their microanalysis hinted at anecdotal evidence of a mismatch between the design of targeted sanctions and their actual impact in the field: Illustratively, their research revealed that a 2004 United Nations (UN) blacklist was mocked locally for featuring only three designees who were viewed as peripheral in terms of political power
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