Abstract

The experimental investigation of decision-making in humans relies on two distinct types of paradigms, involving either description- or experience-based choices. In description-based paradigms, decision variables (i.e. payoffs and probabilities) are explicitly communicated by means of symbols. In experience-based paradigms decision variables are learnt from trial-by-trial feedback. In the decision-making literature, ‘description–experience gap’ refers to the fact that different biases are observed in the two experimental paradigms. Remarkably, well-documented biases of description-based choices, such as under-weighting of rare events and loss aversion, do not apply to experience-based decisions. Here, we argue that the description–experience gap represents a major challenge, not only to current decision theories, but also to the neuroeconomics research framework, which relies heavily on the translation of neurophysiological findings between human and non-human primate research. In fact, most non-human primate neurophysiological research relies on behavioural designs that share features of both description- and experience-based choices. As a consequence, it is unclear whether the neural mechanisms built from non-human primate electrophysiology should be linked to description-based or experience-based decision-making processes. The picture is further complicated by additional methodological gaps between human and non-human primate neuroscience research. After analysing these methodological challenges, we conclude proposing new lines of research to address them.This article is part of the theme issue ‘Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates’.

Highlights

  • We argue that the above-mentioned differences do present a technical issue, and a major epistemological challenge for the neuroeconomic agenda

  • Systematic comparisons between these two decision-making modes revealed the existence of robust description–experience gaps regarding risk preferences in humans [65,66,67]

  • Our review suggests that the rhesus monkey is a partial model of human decision-making under uncertainty

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Summary

The neuroeconomic research programme

The expected utility model was established as the standard normative model of decision-making under risk [1,2]. Concerning adjudicating on competing theories (our first issue), by opening the brain ‘black box’ functional neuroimaging studies would provide an additional crucial observable measure—blood oxygen level dependent signal (BOLD: an aggregate and indirect measure of neural electrical activity), to compare, falsify and refine behavioural models. We define this approach as the weak neuroeconomic agenda, as it does not involve rewriting economic descriptive theories [20,21,22].

The experience–description gap
Decision under risk in monkeys
The impact of other experimental differences
Conclusion and perspectives
Full Text
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