The delegation of discretionary power in international agreements: New comparative evidence from the association of Southeast Asian Nations

Abstract

Abstract According to the transaction-costs perspective on delegation, decision-makers grant more discretion to implementers in relation to policies that are more complex and therefore require more specialist expertise to implement. Furthermore, decision-makers grant less delegation to implementers when those implementers have divergent preferences and are therefore more costly to monitor. The transaction-costs perspective has implications for the design of international agreements, such as those adopted by the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). While delegation in the EU has been the subject of systematic research, delegation in ASEAN has not. We argue that ASEAN offers a particularly hard test of the transaction-costs perspective, especially in relation to its propositions concerning implementers’ policy preferences. Notwithstanding the unique characteristics of ASEAN, the evidence provides strong support for the transaction-costs perspective both in terms of specialist expertise and implementers’ preferences. The new dataset we examine includes information on more than 8,500 major provisions within the 235 legal instruments adopted by ASEAN since 1967.