Herding cats: the role of persuasion in political change and continuity in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

The role of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has become more important in conducting regional affairs with its distinctive approach to interstate relations and regional cooperation. This distinctive practice is called as ‘ASEAN Way’ and the scholars assert that it is a pragmatic and informal approach to conduct intraregional affairs. As viewed by the scholars, what sets the ASEAN apart from many other regional institutions is its own process of decision-making, typically referred to as the “ASEAN Way’ (Weber, 2019). The ASEAN Way consists of a code of conduct for inter-state behavior as well as decision- making process based on consultations and consensus among its member states (Acharya, 1997). This ASEAN model or ‘ASEAN Way’ provides example of how a region can manage its problem and develop a positive identity in International Relations. Therefore, both in terms of intraregional and extra regional perceptions, Southeast Asia has become a symbol of a dynamic and largely peaceful region (Acharya, 2012). The central objective of this paper is to conceptualize the significance of ‘ASEAN Way’ as a distinctive approach to conduct regional affairs and highlight its implications for sustaining regional cooperation. The idea of ‘ASEAN Way’ is examined in this paper with specific reference to two important propositions. The first holds that ‘ASEAN Way’ is a normative approach to conduct intraregional affairs and it possess distinctive features compared to other regional practices. The second proposition holds that ‘ASEAN Way’ is potential as a mean for peaceful settlement of regional disputes. In order to realize these objectives, this study intends to answer these two research questions; what are the distinctive features of ‘ASEAN Way’ as an approach to conduct regional affairs and how it can be attributed as a peaceful mean for settling regional disputes. This study adopts a qualitative approach and primarily depends on the secondary data to answer the aforesaid research questions.

In 1967, when the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established, its members (then Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand; Brunei joined in 1984) found themselves plagued by a wide range of security problems. These included intra-regional conflicts, domestic instability, extra-regional intervention, and latent inter-ethnic tensions. It was not accidental that the ASEAN states as a group of newly independent (with the exception of Thailand, which had never been a colony) developing countries prioritized ‘respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states’ and ‘non-interference in the affairs of States’. Rather, the commitment of ASEAN members to the principle of the modern Westphalian state system should be understood in the context of the search for internal stability and regime security as newly independent countries engaged in nation-building and state-making. What made ASEAN politico-security regionalism (driven by nation-state centrism) really distinctive were the norms and values which came to be known as the ‘ASEAN Way’, Within the ASEAN Way context, in particular, this article explores ASEAN’s role in the Cambodian conflict (1978-1989) for the purpose of tracing the scope of which it contributed to the consolidation of ASEAN’s norms and principles regarding the way of conflict management in Southeast Asia. Indeed, ASEAN had considered the feasibility of accepting Vietnam (as well as Laos and Cambodia) within its group. However, Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 undermined an initial idea on the part of ASEAN to include Vietnam within its regional grouping. Therefore, by 1978 the intensifying conflict between Vietnam (supported by the Soviet Union) and Cambodia (backed by China) was a great difficulty to ASEAN for achieving the goal of ‘One Southeast Asia’ concept through including the rest of Southeast Asia. Against this background, this article analyses the creation, evolution and process of ASEAN politico-security regionalism up to the end of Cold War in order to highlight ASEAN’s approach to conflict management in the Cambodian crisis. Key words: Historical Evolution, ASEAN, Regionalism, ASEAN Way, Cambodian Conflict, Southeast Asia DOI : 10.7176/JAAS/58-12 Publication date :November 30 th 2019

Severino (2011) usefully informs us about what processes and issues the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has come through to promote regional economic cooperation and what obstacles ASEAN has to overcome in the process toward the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015. Severino succinctly describes a constellation of ASEAN economic cooperation schemes with concise explanations. His paper will serve as a useful historical guide in this field. This is an important exercise since evaluations of ASEAN's role in regional cooperation, including regional integration in a wider East Asia, are starkly divided among international relations specialists. Sound empirical research on ASEAN's effort to accomplish the AEC is required. One of the most controversial debates regarding ASEAN cooperation has evolved around the so-called ASEAN Way, its guiding principle which informally stipulates nonintervention, nonbinding, and consensus-based decision-making approaches to regional cooperation. For instance, the ASEAN Way is considered to be an impediment to a high level of regional institutionalization because it tends to avoid transnational cooperation which often requires the imposition of regulations and obligations on each state. The ASEAN Way is mainly applied to the political and security fields, but the basic elements can also be identified even in the economic field. Regional integration through Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) which involve legally binding provisions for the reciprocal exchange of preferences that discriminate against nonpartner countries is inharmonious with the ASEAN Way. It seems that a mismatch between ASEAN norms and economic integration practices has hindered the further institutionalization of ASEAN economic cooperation, something which Severino (2011) explains in a great deal of detail. One of the most important issues Severino raises concerns ASEAN's cooperation with external larger states and its role in a wider regional integration framework. This is because what has sustained ASEAN's need for the further promotion of integration schemes to accomplish economic growth is the need to secure external markets and elicit wider economic cooperation from larger extraregional states, rather than just sharing the benefits to be accrued from intraregional cooperation. In effect, nearly 80% of ASEAN's trade has been with non-ASEAN countries, and the exports of Indonesia and the Philippines to the ASEAN region are less than 10% and 6%, respectively, of their total exports, while the combined population of these two nations account for nearly 60% of the ASEAN total. Furthermore, 90% of foreign direct investment (FDI) has been from non-ASEAN economies. Although Severino consistently asserts that ASEAN has kept the major powers engaged in East Asia with itself as the hub and core, through the ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3), FTAs, or the East Asia Summit (EAS), a step toward the commencement of negotiations of an East Asia FTA, be it ASEAN+3 or ASEAN Plus Six (ASEAN+6), depends on ASEAN's willingness to move beyond this framework. ASEAN's reluctance to move trade liberalization by itself, or perhaps its inability to take the political initiative toward wider regional integration as a unified player, can be found in the fact that it has never proposed an FTA to any of those “+1” partners. ASEAN as a loose group of relatively small economies inevitably depends on external economies for its growth through FDI and exports, but a view that its institutional significance would be diminished if a larger arrangement such as an East Asian FTA developed rapidly is ASEAN's major dilemma. The lack of willingness and capability on the part of ASEAN would be a major obstacle to the establishment of region-wide integration in East Asia, so the conclusion that ASEAN+1 FTAs would “serve as building blocks for freer trade in goods and services and for investment liberalization and facilitation in the region and in the world” (Severino, 2011, p. 30) needs further exploration. A major factor that has made it possible for ASEAN to host the ASEAN+3 Summits, an event which is often cited to validate ASEAN's greater role in East Asia, is competition between China and Japan because both regional powers, strongly suspicious of each other's initiatives, tended to have strong incentives to drive ASEAN to side with either of them. They avoided engaging in full-scale completion for regional hegemony, and what they tried to do was to attract ASEAN to their side through the financial support for ASEAN's integration effort, as a prerequisite for East Asian integration. In fact, despite the positive evaluations of expanded ASEAN machinery to socialize East Asia with the same norms and values that ASEAN has developed, it is still difficult to discern any official statement which clearly delineates what ASEAN actually does in this context (Jones & Smith, 2007). Now that trilateral cooperation among China, Japan, and Korea has started to flourish with the growth of trans- and intragovernmental networks, and that the negotiations for a trilateral investment treaty are almost complete and a feasibility study report for the trilateral FTA is expected to be submitted to the 2012 Summit, the establishment of an AEC by 2015 is ASEAN's urgent need. Yet, Severino (2011) demonstrates that ASEAN will face a thorny process to achieve this aim.

As the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) continues its dynamic evolution towards establishing the ASEAN Community by 2015, one of its key areas of policy focus is to enhance its regional intellectual property (IP) framework and promote greater IP cooperation, so as to advance economic competitiveness and transform the region into a significant and competitive bloc in the international community. While recognizing this desire for broader IP cooperation, ASEAN member states have traditionally guarded their sovereignty fervently and upheld diplomacy the ASEAN Way. The ASEAN Way emphasizes consensus and non-interference. Earlier attempts at IP harmonization faced numerous setbacks and had to be put on the back burner. Nonetheless, ASEAN remained committed to advancing its goal of establishing a “creative ASEAN economy.” Its recent adoption of a regional IP cooperation model enables its members to move forward collectively but at varying paces. This model also seeks to preserve diversity and gives due recognition to the differing levels of development of its member states. This article seeks to bring about a general appreciation of how ASEAN has persevered in its quest to strike an appropriate balance between advancing the mutual regional interests of its member states, while still preserving the diverse national interests of its various stakeholders. This article discusses the idea that as ASEAN moves resolutely towards establishing the ASEAN Community, it is important that it perseveres in its quest for an inclusive regional IP regime that balances the diverse national interests of its member states with their mutual regional interests. From a broader global perspective, unless and until the development gap and disparities in IP creation, utilization and exploitation among nations are closed, or at least minimized, lessons can perhaps be learned from harmonizing IP the ASEAN way. Specifically, this article will seek, inter alia, to: (1) provide a brief overview of ASEAN and diplomacy based on the ASEAN Way; (2) discuss the ASEAN Framework Agreement and selected initiatives on IP cooperation; (3) review and analyze the progress of ASEAN IP integration; and (4) share some concluding thoughts.

This article examines the challenges to the diplomatic and security culture of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as posed by Thailand's spurned proposal for ‘flexible engagement’ and the pursuit of ‘enhanced interaction’ by some ASEAN members in intramural relations. It asks whether these challenges should be understood as turning points in the way in which regional leaderships in Southeast Asia interact. The article argues that while the ‘ASEAN way’ is indeed changing, this change, at least for the moment, focuses mainly on extending the range of issues and contexts traditionally defined as internal affairs in which other ASEAN governments may now legitimately become involved. Considerations about ASEAN cohesion, regime security and regional influence do not suggest an imminent or complete abandonment of ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture. The likelihood that enhanced interaction will continue to be pursued by ASEAN leaderships should therefore not be seen to imply that principles such as quiet diplomacy or restraint have already become obsolete.

ABSTRACTHas the ‘ASEAN Way’ – a set of rules of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) centered on the principle of non-interference and consensus decision-making – really established its position as an ASEAN norm? This paper aims to analyze the discourses of each ASEAN country and empirically explain their attitudes toward the norm. Specifically, I review various documentations to examine how various ASEAN diplomats have used the term ‘ASEAN Way.’ How did they come to call the principle of non-interference and consensus decision-making ‘ASEAN Way’ in the early 1990s? Why have they begun using the term negatively, as something to be reformed, in recent years? By describing the discourses on the ‘ASEAN Way’ and their changes over the years, I show that the rationality of non-interference and consensus decision-making has changed over time and shifted the positioning of the ‘ASEAN way’ as a symbol. This presents a new and empirical interpretation of the changes in ASEAN Norms.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been hailed as one of the more successful regional organisations in the developing world, credited for maintaining regional peace and stabilit...

Is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) receptive to the norm exports of the EU? Is it thus appropriate to analyse ASEAN in comparison to the EU, or does ASEAN provide a distinct example of regionalism? This chapter explores these questions in the context of a particular empirical puzzle. The 2008 ASEAN Charter purportedly establishes a ‘legal and institutional framework’ for ASEAN. It contains several apparent institutional innovations, including the strengthening of the ASEAN Secretariat. However, these ambitions are not matched by changes to the Association’s institutional capacity. This chapter reviews the institutional innovations made by the Charter, and argues that change in ASEAN institutions is contingent upon traditional interpretations of ASEAN norms—particularly sovereignty, non-interference and the ‘ASEAN Way’ of consensus decision-making. ASEAN states do consider the EU ‘model’ to some extent, but they often do this to highlight the ways in which ASEAN is distinct. Thus, for the most part, ASEAN is a ‘resister’ of EU norm exports.

Narratives are essential for organizations and states to provide a framework for their decision-making processes and organizational structure and bolster their legitimacy by appealing to shared values and worldviews. These narratives will play a greater role in a multipolar world characterized by a diversity of worldviews and values that shape the internal and external perceptions of international actors. The authors compare the critical narratives forwarded by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), namely the Shanghai Spirit and the ASEAN Way. Drawing on scientific works dedicated to explicating the worldview, values, and norms espoused by the Shanghai Spirit and the ASEAN Way, the authors use syncretic approaches to show how these concepts are applied in these narratives. The Shanghai Spirit is based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, quality, respect for the diversity of civilizations, and the pursuit of common development. Similarly, the ASEAN Way is based on non-interference, non-confrontation, non-use of force, and consensus-based decision-making. The Shanghai Spirit and the ASEAN Way have notable similarities, such as an emphasis on preserving sovereignty, a pragmatic approach to regionalism, and a flexible, non-binding application. Although they also have significant differences, such as the rationale behind them, different preferred means of cooperation, and an emphasis on state security versus human security. The article argues that the unique features of the Shanghai Spirit and the ASEAN Way, which promote loose regionalism, combined with the state-centric Westphalian features of the contemporary international system, result in a new form of regionalism that is open yet preserves and reinforces the individual sovereignty of states. In this sense, the Shanghai Spirit and the ASEAN Way may provide the intellectual basis for a new form of regionalism and international relations that can better respond to the emerging challenges of a multipolar world.

Transboundary haze has become almost an annual environmental issue in the Southeast Asia region, especially for Malaysia due to the Indonesian fires in Kalimantan and Sumatra. Consequently, this has also become one of the main regional concerns for environmental security of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, ASEAN has continually failed to effectively mitigate haze through regional engagement known as the ASEAN Way, which consists of consultation and consensus and upholds sovereign right and non interference policy. Adherence to these principles by member states has undermined the haze mitigation efforts and raised a big question mark as ASEAN has used all diplomatic channels but was not successful in addressing the problem. Since the haze issue does not only affect Indonesia but also neighbouring countries, the ASEAN Way practices need to revamp addressing transnational issues. Therefore, this chapter has reviewed 40 relevant articles and reports with the aim of providing secondary data support that argues the ASEAN Way of regional engagement has become a challenge to various nontraditional security issues with the main focus on transboundary haze pollution.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN ) has developed mechanisms of managing conflicts that take place between or within its member states. Although in its earlier form, the so-called the ASEAN Way of conflict management was state-centric in its basic nature, it has been under transformation in the new transnational landscape of the region. The issue of “human insecurity” is one of the new challenges that the conventional ASEAN Way faces, demanding the protection of individual persons from the scourges of conflict and social instability. This chapter investigates and assesses to what degree ASEAN has been coping with this new challenge. To achieve this objective, it investigates how relevant concepts and documents, such as human rights , human security , responsibility to protect (R2P), the ASEAN Community and the ASEAN Charter , are becoming operationalized in the region by intergovernmental cooperation and civil society networks. Based on the insights obtained by theoretical arguments and case studies from Myanmar , the chapter concludes that ASEAN is gradually changing its basic character from “regime incubator” to “human security incubator” in order to effectively address the region’s humanitarian situations in a unique way.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a regional organization of countries aiming to promote amity and international cooperation between its member states. It seeks to build a mutually beneficial community supported by three pillars: political-security, economic, and sociocultural. The goal of the ASEAN is primarily economic in nature: improving the mobility of goods and services within the region as well as facilitating trade with external partners. The ASEAN was never meant to be a unitary political body similar to the United States or the European Union, hence the ASEAN Way: its emphasis on nonintervention in sovereign affairs and consensus-building. Because of this, the ASEAN remains a mere potential to be a global force for change, particularly in areas of pressing regional concern like international environmental law and transnational criminal law, among others. This paper forwards recommendations for transforming the ASEAN into more than just an economic community; rather, the ASEAN should be a leader of social change in the global setting. This paper focuses on cementing the ASEAN Way through more binding multilateral agreements, integrating various aspects of international law into meeting the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It does so through the perspective of citizen engagement, particularly youth empowerment, in order to rally regional political support for these initiatives. It concludes that for successful development in the region to take place, law and governance must be inclusive for all.

This article uses the reflection on the direction (whither) and health (wither) of constructivism and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that was witnessed in 2017 to see what these deliberations reveal about the fixity of norms and their contestation. The argument presented is that constitutive norms create fixed parameters of shared understandings but that within those parameters the meaning and application of the norm can be contested and debated. This insight helps to bridge the gap between conventional and critical constructivists and shows that the premise of jettisoning the ASEAN Way as necessary for ASEAN to achieve its ambitious community-building project is flawed. The argument relies on insights from the constructivist literature on norm degeneration to show how contestation is not one part of a norm’s life cycle but rather a constant companion. However, norms are not just contested, but they have fixity, and here practice theory can help show that the social world is just as much about continuity as it is change. The ASEAN case study is timely as introspection about the efficacy of its constitutive norms – the ASEAN Way – was prominent in 2017 as ASEAN turned 50.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has developed its legal framework for economic cooperation for more than two decades, but it still has been facing compliance issues. This Article explores the legalization characteristics of ASEAN economic agreements including trade agreements. In general, the legal frameworks of ASEAN have been influenced by the notion of the ASEAN way. ASEAN design its agreements including flexible and less binding commitments. In practice, ASEAN trade agreements such as the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) provide ASEAN member states flexibilities. The provision of Article 23 of the ATIGA allows ASEAN member states to apply suspension of concession measures as a safeguard measure where they face unforeseen difficulties in implementing its tariffs commitments. However, there is not substantial provision or definition related unforeseen difficulties in implementing under the ATIGA. How ASEAN and member states define a meaning of “unforeseen difficulties in implementing?” The research reviews problems, causes and effects of problems and finally provides a possible solution. This paper suggests that ASEAN should constitute a definition, scope and requirements of safeguard measures.

This article examines the diffusion of the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDR) from the United Nations (UN) to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Despite its varying interpretations in international negotiations since the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), CBDR’s meaning hardly experienced any change in ASEAN. ASEAN’s different interpretation of CBDR from the UN matched the unchanging internal and external role expectations of ASEAN, which were a product of member states’ learning and conditioned by cognitive priors in the region. Cognitive priors in the climate change context included the ‘ASEAN Way’ of collaboration and member states’ deep-seated aspirations for development. The empirical study shows that internally, ASEAN acted as an interactive space for information exchange and a relationship facilitator; externally, it has embraced the position as the voice amplifier for member states in international negotiations. Maintaining the UNFCCC version of CBDR tallied well with ASEAN’s role expectations to: 1) provide member states with room to develop national actions that meet their respective priorities (internal); and 2) put member states in a better position to defend their interests in negotiating adaptation and mitigation responsibilities with extra-regional states (external).