Abstract

Although psychology has been criticized for adhering to outmoded conceptions of knowledge (e.g. logical positivism), the assertion is made that at least one branch of psychology, namely cognitive psychology, is in the position to corroborate and extend contemporary philosophy of science. Kuhn's “learned perception of similarity” and the related notion of exemplar, which serve to exemplify more adequate conceptions of knowledge within the philosophy of science, are shown to converge with cognitive psychology's schema theory. In this way, the schema theory's empirical offspring provide a validation mechanism for Kuhn's notions and thus provide a richer understanding of the scientific enterprise. This convergence is seen as instantiating an epistemological trend towards understanding of limitations and validity of scientific evidence through an understanding of the limitations and validity of the scientist.

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