Kuhn and cognitive psychology: A response to Gibson

Abstract

The paper by Bradley S. Gibson represents a laudable effort to demonstrate how important concepts in Kuhn’s theory of science (i.e. “exemplar” and “learned perception of similarity”) articulate with theoretical concepts in cognitive psychology (i.e. “schema”). Two decades of theoretical development in cognitive psychology provide strong support for the claim that the field possesses the required methodology and conceptual power to ultimately elucidate the intellectual processes that make possible scientific thinking, discovery and verification. It certainly is timely to apply cognitive psychology to real-world processes including science. As a matter of fact, a high quality literature already kxists that deals with the cognitive processes that operate in scientific activities, such as the development of expertise, problem solving and discovery. Gibson, in fact, cites several important papers that are part of that literature (e.g. Chi et al., 1981). Before commenting on the details of Gibson’s cognitive analysis of Kuhnian concepts, it may be helpful to place Kuhn’s scholarly work in a broader historical context. The contemporary era in philosophy of science is largely a result of the combined work of Kuhn (1962), Polanyi (1964), Toulmin (1963) and others. This approach, which has been labeled paradigm theory (Manicas SC Secord, 1983), replaced the older doctrine of Vienna Circle Logical Positivism. Known as logical empiricism in this country, logical positivism dominated philosophy of science and most conceptions of Western science from about 1920 through 1960 (Ayer, 1959). Logical positivists generally subscribed to a unitary notion of canonical validation-namely, that rule-goverhed procedures based on the formal logic of Princijk~ vnathematica are what drives all significant decisionmaking in science, including which knowledge claims are worth considering and which are to be regarded as proven (Brown, 1979). In contrast, paradigm theory takes explicit notice that much scientific d<cision-making, including the verification of claims about natural phenomena, is made by consortia decision-making groups consisting of editors, consultants, -referees, etc. While the scientific community strongly values formal representation and logical deduction, many of its decisions are not logical. This is not to say that they are illogical; rather, they are consensual. While most consensual decisions can be defended on one or another intellectual basis, the defense is persuasive rather