The Constitution of Zimbabwe: Towards A Model for Africa?

Abstract

On 18 April, 1991, the Republic of Zimbabwe celebrated its 11th year of independence. Coincidentally, just a few months earlier, the 11th constitutional amendment Act was passed. This flurry of legislative activity was the result of a desire on the part of the government to develop a new constitutional structure rather than to remain with the constitution which was essentially imposed upon it by the British during the 1979 Lancaster House conference which eventually led to independence in 1980. The new constitutional model is of considerable interest as it is based upon those operating in many other African nations but, according to the Minister of Justice, is designed to provide safeguards on the exercise of presidential power and to avoid unnecessary conflict and division between the various branches of government. On several occasions, ministers have stressed the autochthonous nature of the new structure and some have indeed suggested that it might form a model for other African countries.It is the intention of this article to examine the legitimacy of these assertions by analysing both the new constitutional structure and its operation in practice. In order to assess the significance of these changes, it is first necessary to examine very briefly the Lancaster House constitution and constitutional developments in the early years of independence.