The consensus of material and discursive geopolitical codes to contain China in the Indo-Pacific

Conventional Wisdom and the Next Unknown

The Big Question: Which Country Will Emerge as the Leading Power?

Purpose: As the competition for supremacy between the United States and China intensifies, the strategic instability of neighboring countries is gradually increasing, and the Cold War era s new competition structure, which requires the choice of one of two options: the United States and China, is being recreated. In this situation, Australia is the most active country in the US containment policy toward China, expressing concerns about the rise of China without filtering. This study attempts to examine the reasons why Australia, which is located at a distance from China and has high economic interdependence, is recognizing China as a threat and actively participating in the US-led containment policy of China . Method: In this study, we will look at Australia s policy toward China from the perspective of Constructivism in order to find out the factors that form Australia s perception of threats to China. First of all, the framework of the analysis was formed through basic discussions on Constructivism, looking at the conflict between Australia and China, and focusing on the results of the survey that analyzed Australian people s identity and historical perspective and perception of China by looking at the culture and perception formed in Australia, I want to achieve my research purpose. Results: The United States and Australia are independent countries from the United Kingdom and share a racial, religious and cultural base. The United States and Australia, which have been working together to resolve important international conflicts and wars since World War I, maintain a solid alliance system based on ANSUS. Moreover, after the COVID-19 incident, the spread of hatred toward the Chinese in Australia, the expansion of China s influence, and the issue of the South China Sea are rising, increasing awareness that the national interests of the United States and Australia are infringed. Australia, which shares its perception and identity of China from a constructivist point of view with the United States, will continue to actively cooperate with the United States containment policy toward China and strengthen cooperation with Western countries centered on the United States. Conclusion: Although Australia is located in Asia, Australian identity, culture and historical values are closer to the Western world. As a member of the Commonwealth, Australia maintains partnerships in various fields, including politics, economic security and academia, along with the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand, which are expected to continue in the future. Australia, which has a Western identity, will strengthen cooperation with the Quad Council for stability and protection of national interests in the Indo-Pacific region and strengthen checks against China. Australia s foreign policy can be assessed as being influenced by the national identity of the United States, which shares threats to China, and strengthens cooperation with security alliances such as the United States and the United Kingdom, which share traditional values and culture, to check China. I will do it.

Canada may be a Pacific nation, but one would hardly know it, given its history of merely sporadic and inconsistent engagement with the Indo-Pacific region. The idea of a proud legacy of special relations with Asian nations is clearly overblown. Canada’s relations with the Indo-Pacific region are in need of serious attention and forethought.There is cause for concern: With the spectacular economic rise, and growing influence, of certain Asian nations, Canada’s pattern of Indo-Pacific neglect is proving increasingly unaffordable. Canada may not have squandered any significant legacy from the past, but it might easily squander the potential for crucial relations in the future.Understandably, that has led some observers to call for a sort of “grand strategy” for Canada to deal with the Indo-Pacific region: an overarching framework that would co-ordinate all the various facets — economic, institutional and security — where Canadian interests do and will touch the Indo-Pacific region. Yet, again, these calls are misplaced: Canada must be more engaged in the region, but there are instances where it should address issues on a seriatim basis (that is, confronting and responding to issues on their own, as they emerge). In some cases, a strategic framework may be prudent, but not in all cases. The appropriate approach is neither a grand strategy, nor a “muddling through” approach, but rather, something in between: partly strategically planned, partly not.In particular, it would be inadvisable for Canada to fully commit to any standing security strategy to deal with the rise of China’s military power. Canada is not a global military power, whereas its closest ally, the United States, is the world’s largest military power. The American strategy toward China will influence Canada’s approach more than any other factor, however the U.S. strategy is currently largely unclear. For Canada to be proactive in independently developing a security strategy with regard to China could result in waste and even conflict with our allies.Indeed, in evaluating Canada’s security position vis-a-vis the entire Indo-Pacific region, the factors largely seem to favour Canada taking a seriatim approach: Canada’s natural and optimal position, given its military status, is to take a reactive, second-mover approach, rather than a first-mover approach.Somewhat ironically, Canada’s history of inattentiveness towards the Indo-Pacific region may actually provide Canada with increased flexibility and advantage in the new era of rising Asian power: Put simply, save for a few examples, there is a distinct lack of baggage between Canada and the Indo-Pacific nations, leaving something close to a clean start for future relations. It is, however, critical that Canada not allow that past irresponsible practice to persist. Notions of some “grand strategy” for the Indo-Pacific region may be misguided. But given the ascendant role of Indo-Pacific nations in the 21st century, it would be even more unwise for Canada to maintain its longstanding pattern of indifference toward the region.

Canada may be a Pacific nation, but one would hardly know it, given its history of merely sporadic and inconsistent engagement with the Indo-Pacific region. The idea of a proud legacy of special relations with Asian nations is clearly overblown. Canada’s relations with the Indo-Pacific region are in need of serious attention and forethought. There is cause for concern: With the spectacular economic rise, and growing influence, of certain Asian nations, Canada’s pattern of Indo-Pacific neglect is proving increasingly unaffordable. Canada may not have squandered any significant legacy from the past, but it might easily squander the potential for crucial relations in the future. Understandably, that has led some observers to call for a sort of “grand strategy” for Canada to deal with the Indo-Pacific region: an overarching framework that would co-ordinate all the various facets — economic, institutional and security — where Canadian interests do and will touch the Indo-Pacific region. Yet, again, these calls are misplaced: Canada must be more engaged in the region, but there are instances where it should address issues on a seriatim basis (that is, confronting and responding to issues on their own, as they emerge). In some cases, a strategic framework may be prudent, but not in all cases. The appropriate approach is neither a grand strategy, nor a “muddling through” approach, but rather, something in between: partly strategically planned, partly not. In particular, it would be inadvisable for Canada to fully commit to any standing security strategy to deal with the rise of China’s military power. Canada is not a global military power, whereas its closest ally, the United States, is the world’s largest military power. The American strategy toward China will influence Canada’s approach more than any other factor, however the U.S. strategy is currently largely unclear. For Canada to be proactive in independently developing a security strategy with regard to China could result in waste and even conflict with our allies. Indeed, in evaluating Canada’s security position vis-à-vis the entire Indo-Pacific region, the factors largely seem to favour Canada taking a seriatim approach: Canada’s natural and optimal position, given its military status, is to take a reactive, second-mover approach, rather than a first-mover approach. Somewhat ironically, Canada’s history of inattentiveness towards the Indo-Pacific region may actually provide Canada with increased flexibility and advantage in the new era of rising Asian power: Put simply, save for a few examples, there is a distinct lack of baggage between Canada and the Indo-Pacific nations, leaving something close to a clean start for future relations. It is, however, critical that Canada not allow that past irresponsible practice to persist. Notions of some “grand strategy” for the Indo-Pacific region may be misguided. But given the ascendant role of Indo-Pacific nations in the 21st century, it would be even more unwise for Canada to maintain its longstanding pattern of indifference toward the region.

Chinese foreign policy initiative has turned out to be a negative reaction from the United States of America (USA) and its allies, as it is perceived to contain the agenda for territorial expansion in the sense of an expanding political influence covered by infra structures and trade investment activities. Along with the darkening of a OBOR (one belt, one road) map followed by the interests of China to secure the Silk Road through the presence of its military force. A number of countries in Southeast Asia, such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, including Indonesia have expressed their complaints regarding China's claims to the South China Sea. China has already positioned as regional power that "challenges" a vis-a-vis the United States as a superpower that maintains a status-quo continuity in the Indo-Pacific hemisphere. This research used qualitative research method, data collected through interviews with informants to be able to dig up information so that accurate information can be obtained in accordance with the theme of this study. The selection of informants was determined using a purposive technique. While secondary data collected from various relevant documents. This research analyzes that The United States' foreign policy to stem the rise and expansion of China's impact in the Asia-Pacific region, harmonizes with concerns from several countries in the region for the rise of China with its foreign policy judged assertive. Setting out from the policy to stem the China influence, it can be said, the United States of America refers to its experience in the cold war as it stemming the expanding influence of the Soviet Union through the Containment Policy. Only this time has the United States been confronted with such vastly different conditions. These conditions that the United States is unable to "brace" for, so containment policy repetition through some of its implementation such as rebalance, free and open indo-pacific to offshore balancing still test its effectiveness.

Emergence of Indo-Pacific is a strategic reality of this century as global economic power is shifting from West to the East. Chinese extremist policy across the Indian and Pacific Oceans breaks the security arrangement established after end of cold war. India’s role is considered crucial by countries like United States, Japan, Australia and ASEAN. Indian engagement in this area represents a shift in strategy—realizing expanding threats from its continental border to its maritime space. In recent years, diplomatic relation between India and China have centered on power play, there is a competition for resources and regional influence. China has exercised strategic and diplomatic tools to oppose India on many issues including APEC, NSG and India’s claims for permanent seat in UN Security Council. India is trying to develop an extraordinary naval capability for operating in the Indo-Pacific and, similarly, China is also doing the same and it is likely that the Indo-Pacific environment will be the test of the capability for co-existence or clash between the two. United States has shown interest for India to balance China’s rise and the stagnation for Japan to establish a stable regional balance of power. China is more dominant other than United States in this area and will try to take control over Taiwan and South China Sea. China will also continue to disturb the political systems of countries in the Indo-Pacific specifically. United States is having more human potential as compared with others having in the world and having world’s best technological advancement, but the best asset in the Indo-Pacific region is its democratic allies with Japan, South Korea and Australia are having a structural development in diplomatic relations since last 15 years, which will help India to rise in this area. Both are having a commitment towards the democratic features and rule of law. India is having a vision and inclusive approach towards Indo-Pacific, but it can only be taken seriously only if it is ready to provide security for the Indian Ocean in actual. India must deal with these challenges, building collective capacity, promoting cooperation within region through small and big associations like Indian Ocean Rim, Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). This paper will raise the question of peace and stability in Indo-Pacific and try to find out what is the comprehensive security picture from Indian perspective and what strategies India should adopt to create a balance in Indo-Pacific. First part of the paper ‘Introduction’ will discuss desirability of India’s involvement in Indo- Pacific in changed political environment since post-cold war. In the second part of the paper, rise of QUAD, ASEAN Centrality and India’s bilateral and trilateral engagements in Indo-Pacific will be discussed. India aims at using this area as strategic interests, third part of the paper will discuss geo-political challenges for India under heading ‘China and India: Competing Friends or Rivals’. Conclusion is an effort to sum up how India can take Indo-Pacific region as an opportunity for completion of their National interest.

The Indo-Pacific region has become the strategic theatre for twenty-first century great power rivalry between the United States and China. The paper aims to analyze the dynamics of Sino-US strategic competition and its implications for regional stability, security architecture, and the agency of local actors. The article addresses key flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific region that includes the South China Sea disputes, East China Sea tensions, the Taiwan issue, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. These challenges contribute significantly to heightened insecurity, maritime tensions, and the risk of escalation. The paper also analyzes the responses of key regional states -India, the Philippines, and Pakistan as these three countries pursue distinct approaches. The findings suggest that the Indo-Pacific is more than a geographic theater of US-China rivalry. It is the crucible of the emerging global order. The outcome of this competition will not only determine regional security but also influence the character of international politics in the twenty-first century. The interplay between great power strategies and regional responses is therefore essential for anticipating future challenges and opportunities in an evolving multipolar world.

The newly minted concept of the “Indo-Pacific Region” (IPR) is generally seen as a response by the United States and its allies to China’s growing influence in strategically important areas of the Pacific and Indian oceans. However, the view of IPR as a single (U.S.-led) anti-Beijing front is simplistic and misleading, obscuring a variety of approaches by the region’s states. New Delhi has a strong tradition of non-alignment, whereas Tokyo is more interested in rules that restrict unilateral actions not only by China but also by other regional players, including the United States. Australian business is very cautious about frictions in trade relations with China. Beijing views the growing military activity of the United States off its shores, including in the South China Sea, as a threat to regional stability. According to the authoritative Chinese sources, the Indo-Pacific strategy of Donald Trump is part of broader efforts to prevent China from becoming a dominant regional and global power. At the same time, the development of Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) understanding of the Indo-Pacific region is less of a concern to Beijing, as the South-East Asian countries interested in balancing China and the United States are unlikely to fully join the fight against the “authoritarian threat.” As for Russia, it unequivocally rejects the military/power-based U.S. version of the IPR concept and is more amenable to flexible versions promoted by other players, such as Tokyo’s multilateral vision for the Indo-Pacific Region. In the end, the final response of Russia and China to IPR will thus be determined not only by U.S. actions but also by the behavior of other regional powers.

The vast Indo-Pacific region presents countless opportunities being home to many of the world’s most innovative economies as well as a manufacturing heavyweight which occupies an indispensable role in the international global supply chains. In the last decade, strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific has become a critical US national security issue and, in the backdrop of COVID-19 increasing pressure on the global order, it will remain so for the foreseeable future. China, currently the secondlargest economy globally, is on track to overtake the US by 2030 to become the world’s largest economy. The rise of China as the potential challenger to the US-led Western dominance has signaled the return of great power competition in the international order. Despite the absence of an official Indo-Pacific strategy, there is much that can already be discerned about the Biden administration s approach to the region. Case in point being the formation of AUKUS in September 2021 between the US, UK and Australia. The essence of the strategic competition between China and the US in the Indo-Pacific region is focused on the US’s attempts to decouple from China to deny it easy access to critical technologies and markets. On the other hand, through its multi-billion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China is working to dominate Eurasia and the Asia- Pacific to create a Sino-centric global economic order. This article will analyze the recent increase in strategic competition between the US and China in the Indo-Pacific region through the lens of neo-realism. It will also outline the US’s Indo Pacific Policy as well as China’s response. It will then assess the impact of the Sino-US rivalry in the Indi-Pacific region on South Asia.

The article is aimed at identifying the current foreign policy priorities of the Republic of Korea, taking into account the factor of its special geopolitical position, namely, being at the crossroads of interests and growing rivalry between the two world great powers – the United States and China. The definition of priorities and goals of the Republic of Korea's foreign policy is carried out in the article based on the concept of "geopolitical code" used in political geography. The article reveals the concept of "geopolitical code", traces the evolution of the geopolitical code of the Republic of Korea and characterizes its modern features. The article demonstrates the complex process of balancing the Republic of Korea between the United States and China during the first two decades of the 21st century, at the initial stage caused by different positions and interests of the parties in resolving the North Korean nuclear missile problem, and at the current stage – by the growing regional (in the Asia-Pacific) and global rivalry between the world's two great powers. As a result of the study, it was concluded that the Republic of Korea is striving to maintain a balance in its relations with the great powers and pursue a foreign policy independent of the great powers, which, however, is complicated by the need to maintain close military-political coordination with Washington due to the unresolved North Korean missile nuclear problem and the relentless growth of China's influence on the economy of the Republic of Korea. Preserving the central role of the alliance with the United States and strengthening economic relations with China as the world's second world economy is a continuing reality of the Republic of Korea.

Introduction Daffodil Day, usually held in spring, raises funds for cancer awareness and research using this symbol of hope. On that day, people who donate money to this good cause are usually given a yellow daffodil pin to wear. When I lived in Auckland, New Zealand, on the last Friday in August most people walking around the city centre proudly wore a cheerful yellow flower. So many people generously participated in this initiative that one almost felt obliged to join the cause in order to wear the ‘uniform’ – the daffodil pin – as everyone else did on that day. To donate and to wear a daffodil is the social expectation, and operating in social environment people often endeavour to meet the expectation by doing the ‘appropriate things’ defined by societies or communities. After all, who does not like to receive a beam of acceptance and appreciation from a fellow daffodil bearer in Auckland’s Queen Street? States in international society are no different. In some ways, states wear ‘uniforms’ while executing domestic and foreign affairs just as human beings do within their social groups. States develop the understandings of desirable behaviour from the international community with which they interact and identify. They are ‘socialised’ to act in line with the expectations of international community. These expectations are expressed in the form of international norms, a prescriptive set of ideas about the ‘appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 891). Motivated by this logic of appropriateness, states that comply with certain international norms in world politics justify and undertake actions that are considered appropriate for their identities. This essay starts with examining how international norms can be spread to different countries through the process of ‘state socialisation’ (how the countries are ‘talked into’ wearing the ‘uniform’). Second, the essay investigates the idea of ‘cultural match’: how domestic actors comply with an international norm by interpreting and manipulating it according to their local political and legal practices (how the countries wear the ‘uniform’ differently). Lastly, the essay probes the current international normative community and the liberal values embedded in major international norms (whether states would continue wearing the ‘uniform’). International Norms and State Socialisation: Why Do States Wear the ‘Uniforms’? Norm diffusion is related to the efforts of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ using various platforms to convince a critical mass of states to embrace new norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 895-896). Early studies of norm diffusion tend to emphasise nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) as norm entrepreneurs and advocates, such as Oxfam and its goal of reducing poverty and hunger worldwide (Capie 638). In other empirical research, intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) were shown to serve as ‘norm teachers,’ such as UNESCO educating developing countries the value of science policy organisations (Finnemore 581-586). Additionally, states and other international actors can also play important roles in norm diffusion. Powerful states with more communication resources sometimes enjoy advantages in creating and promoting new norms (Florini 375). For example, the United States and Western European countries have often been considered as the major proponents of free trade. Norm emergence and state socialisation in a normative community often occurs during critical historical periods, such as wars and major economic downturns, when international changes and domestic crises often coincide with each other (Ikenberry and Kupchan 292). For instance, the norm entrepreneurs of ‘responsible power/state’ can be traced back to the great powers (mainly the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union) and their management of international order at the end of WWII (see Bull). With their negotiations and series of international agreements at the Cairo, Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conference in the 1940s, these great powers established a post-World War international society based on the key liberal values of international peace and security, free trade, human rights, and democracy. Human beings are not born to know what appropriate behaviour is; we learn social norms from parents, schools, peers, and other community members. International norms are collective expectations and understanding of how state governments should approach their domestic and foreign affairs. States ‘learn’ international norms while socialising with a normative community. From a sociological perspective, socialisation summarises ‘how and to what extent diverse individuals are meshed with the requirement of collective life’ at the societal level (Long and Hadden 39). It mainly consists of the process of training and shaping newcomers by the group members and the social adjustment of novices to the normative framework and the logic of appropriateness (Long and Hadden 39). Similarly, social psychology defines socialisation as the process in which ‘social organisations influence the action and experience of individuals’ (Gold and Douvan 145). Inspired by sociology and psychology, political scientists consider socialisation to be the mechanism through which norm entrepreneurs persuade other actors (usually a norm novice) to adhere to a particular prescriptive standard (Johnston, “Social State” 16). Norm entrepreneurs can change novices’ behaviour by the methods of persuasion and social influence (Johnston, “Treating International Institutions” 496-506). Socialisation sometimes demands that individual actors should comply with organisational norms by changing their interests or preferences (persuasion). Norm entrepreneurs often attempt to construct an appealing cognitive frame in order to persuade the novices (either individuals or states) to change their normative preferences or adopt new norms. They tend to use language that can ‘name, interpret and dramatise’ the issues related to the emerging norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 987). As a main persuasive device, ‘framing’ can provide a singular interpretation and appropriate behavioural response for a particular situation (Payne 39). Cognitive consistency theory found in psychology has suggested the mechanism of ‘analogy’, which indicates that actors are more likely to accept new ideas that share some similarities to the extant belief or ideas that they have already accepted (see Hybel, ch. 2). Based on this understanding, norm entrepreneurs usually frame issues in a way that can associate and resonate with the shared value of the targeted novices (Payne 43). For example, Finnemore’s research shows that when it promoted the creation of state science bureaucracies in the 1960s, UNESCO associated professional science policy-making with the appropriate role of a modern state, which was well received by the post-war developing countries in Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia (Finnemore 565-597). Socialisation can also emanate actors’ pro-norm behaviour through a cost-benefit calculation made with social rewards and punishments (social influence). A normative community can use the mechanism of back-patting and opprobrium to distribute social reward and punishment. Back-patting – ‘recognition, praise and normative support’ – is offered for a novice’s or member’s cooperative and pro-norm behaviour (Johnston, “Treating International Institutions” 503). In contrast, opprobrium associated with status denial and identity rejection can create social and psychological costs (Johnston 504). Both the reward and punishment grow in intensity with the number of co-operators (Johnston 504). A larger community can often create more criticism towards rule-breakers, and thus greatly increase the cost of disobedience. For instance, the lack of full commitment from major powers, such as China, the United States, and some other OECD countries, has arguably made global collective action towards mitigating climate change more difficult, as the cost of non-compliance is relatively low. While being in a normative environment, novice or emerging states that have not yet been socialised into the international community can respond to persuasion and social influence through the processes of identification and mimicking. Social psychology indicates that when one actor accepts persuasion or social influence based on its desire to build or maintain a ‘satisfying self-defining relationship’ to another actor, the mechanism of identification starts to work (Kelman 53). Identification among a social group can generate ‘obligatory’ behaviour, where individual states make decisions by attempting to match their perceptions of ‘who they are’ (national identity) with the expectation of the normative community (Glodgeier and Tetlock 82). After identifying with the normative community, a novice state would then mimic peer states’ pro-norm behaviour in order to be considered as a qualified member of the social group. For example, when the Chinese government was deliberating over its ratification of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in 2003, a Ministry of Environmental Protection brief noted that China should ratify the Protocol as soon as possible because China had always been a country ‘keeping its word’ in international society, and non-ratification would largely ‘undermine China’s international image and reputation’ (Ministry of Environmental Protection of PRC). Despite the domestic industry’s disagreement with entering into the Protocol, the Chinese government’s self-identification as a ‘responsible state’ that performs its international promises and duties played an important role in China’s adoption of the international norm of biosafety. Domestic Salience of International Norms: How Do States Wear the ‘Uniforms’ Differently? Individual states do not accept international norms passively; instead, state governments often negotiate and interact with domestic a

Purpose: This article examines China s military rise in the Asia Pacific region and the US-led response, based on its global strategy. This paper suggests that China s military rise is based on defensive realism as opposed to offensive realism. The basic assumption of this paper is that the US strategy has the goal of counterbalancing China s expansionism. The US response to China s expansionism is to check China s military rise as a superpower by strengthening its network of alliances in the Indo-Pacific region and Northeast Asia. In the Indo-Pacific re-gion, the US has attempted to check China using the QUAD-Plus(Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with Japan, India, and Australia + Newzealand, South Korea, and Vietnam) which is a sea-based form of security coopera-tion. Method: In this effort, the article uses a framework of international politics based on the theory of realism, which stresses the salience of survival, the maximization of national interest, and self-help. A realist s per-spective of the world rests on the following assumptions: the pursuit of survival, maximization of interests, and self-help. Defensive realists try to preserve power, rather than increasing it as the main goal of states. China s self-assertion in the South China Sea has been galvanized by the survival mindset against the US containment policy toward China. Results: China s self-assertion in the South China Sea has been galvanized by the survival mindset against the US containment policy toward China. China s survival can be better secured by the occupation of the South Chi-na Sea to protect its sea lines of communication. China s militarization of the South China Sea and its military build-up can be illustrated as a self-help project for the maximization of its security interest in the Indo-Pacific region. Conclusion: In this article, I have reached the following conclusions. China s military rise is based on defensive realism, not offensive realism. The basic assumption of this paper is that the US strategy is aiming at the coun-terbalance of China s expansionism. First, The US response to China s expansionism is to check China s military rise as a superpower with the network of alliance-making in the Indo-Pacific region and Northeast Asia. Second, China tries to build a military facility in the South China Sea to maximize its interest in terms of energy, fish, and security. Third, China s military build-up can be illustrated as self-help to meet the balance with the US formida-ble military might. In the Indo-Pacific region, the US tries to check China through the QUAD-PLUS.

At the end of the 20th century, many researchers had envisioned a world where countries shift from political and military competition towards economic competition. However, the prospect of a world without conflict was short-lived, as the concerns about political tensions were revived in the early 21st century. Great powers such as the United States, China and Russia, have all shifted their focus to Asia, in particular the Indo-Pacific region. As a developing country in this region, Vietnam has its reasons to pay close attention to the competition among these great powers. Based on the theory of defensive realism, the author examines the reorientation of the US, Chinese and Russian foreign policy towards the Indo-Pacific region from Vietnam’s perspective. It shows that the US pivot to the region is set to challenge the rise of China and to maintain the US position as the leader of the world, China’s expanding influence is to reclaim its historical position in the region and Russia seeks to diversify its political and economic relations. In this context, Vietnam should maintain its multi-vector foreign policy, balancing the interests of several countries. In addition, Vietnam needs to strengthen its position in the global economy through participation in new-generation free trade agreements, expand the scope and forms of its diplomacy, and play a more active role in the global community. All these, in the author’s opinion, will enable Vietnam to strengthen its position in the global economy and boost its diplomatic activities.

U.S. Strategic Rebalancing to Asia:South Korea's Perspective Chaesung Chun (bio) To South Koreans, and probably to most Asians, the evolution of Washington's rhetoric on its Asia policy has been ambiguous. The Obama administration's declaration that the United States will return, pivot, or rebalance to Asia raised some very natural questions about U.S. policy toward the region. Did the United States ever leave? If it did, then when did it first arrive in Asia? Is this the first return or the second? Why did the United States leave, and why is it now coming back? What messages does Washington want to deliver and to whom? Of course, we all know that the United States never really left Asia; rather, only the relative strategic importance of the region has changed, at least in the minds of U.S. policymakers. The right question should be, then, what does the United States want to accomplish under this newly announced rebalancing strategy? To the United States, the Asia-Pacific is the land of both opportunity and risk. It is the region with the most vibrant economies and the fastest-growing markets, and it will witness a major power shift that may pose a threat to the status of the United States as a global leader. In a time of severe budget deficits and a relative weakening of U.S. power, East Asia in particular will be critical for efforts to revitalize U.S. leadership in both positive and negative senses. Specifically, the United States will strive to make full use of the region's economic potential while preventing China from shaping East Asia according to its own terms and rules. To the Republic of Korea (ROK), the U.S. rebalancing strategy appears to have three core components. First is the policy approach to China. In international politics, when the power gap becomes narrower between two states, the established power will generally not wait until the rising power reaches power parity. According to power transition theory, when a rising power reaches the 20% power range of the established power and the former is dissatisfied with the existing rules of the game, there will be a high probability of hegemonic war. In this regard, a hegemon will tend to act first and intervene, presenting itself as a revisionist power.1 After attempting to set up more cooperative relations with China after the economic crisis [End Page 13] in 2008, which created the confusing rhetoric of a group of two (G-2), the Obama administration seems to have decided to be clearer about the importance of building relations with China. Borrowing from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's remarks at the United States Institute of Peace in March 2012, the United States wants to challenge the historical trend of hegemonic clashes by proving that an established power and a rising power can coexist. "New forms of relations among great powers" is emerging as a slogan, but there are still requirements for great-power relationships. China should respect the already-established rules of the game. Because the global order has been maintained through the United States' hegemonic role in providing global and regional public goods, China cannot be a leader without respecting these rules and fulfilling its burden-sharing commitments as a responsible stakeholder. Soft-power requirements are frequently emphasized as well, implying that a great power can acquire the status of hegemon only by proving itself as a leader in the areas of human rights, free trade, and democracy. The game now is not just about concrete issues concerning military power or economic influence but also about creating and obeying the rules of the game. The question of who will be the legitimate rule-maker transforms the U.S.-China rivalry into a sort of meta-game—i.e., a game about the rules by which to play the real games. In this respect, the United States has returned with the intention to lead the game as the rule-maker and the provider of collective goods. The second component of the U.S. rebalancing strategy is economic. Since 2000, Asia has become the United States' largest source of imports and its second...