The Concept of ‘Action’ in Sociological Analysis

Abstract

Despite their explicit inclusion into the sociological lexicon by Max Weber in 1918, the concepts of ‘action’ and ‘social action’ have remained ambiguous. When related concepts such as ‘act,’ ‘behavior,’ ‘interaction,’ ‘systems of action,’ and ‘social relationship’ are also seen as basic to sociological inquiry, the level of ambiguity is greatly escalated. The reason for this ambiguity is to be found in the tendency for sociologists to become embroiled in enduring philosophical issues when employing the concepts of act, action, and interaction. Indeed, these concepts seem to invite sociologists to take philosophical stands on such issues as what is ‘real,’ what is the proper mode of theoretical inquiry, and what kind of science, if any, can sociology be. Thus, in attempting to review how sociologists have conceptualized social action and related phenomena, we will need to remain aware of these more difficult philosophical issues. In the following pages, therefore, I will remain attuned to these, while at the same time, I will provide a selective but representative overview of how sociologists have conceptualized ‘social action.’ I will begin by analyzing the early conceptual legacy (1900–1935) where the thought of Max Weber, Georg Simmel, Alfred Schutz, and George Herbert Mead is discussed. Then, I will turn to the transitional legacy (1935–1949) where the impact of Talcott Parsons’ and Herbert Blumer’s work is presented.