Abstract
ABSTRACT In 1987, at the 13th National Congress of the CCP, Zhao Ziyang proposed to separate the Party and the State. Like previous attempts at reform, however, this initiative was thwarted and it has been forgotten since the crackdown in 1989. This article compares that blueprint with a contrasting agenda for reform: the centralization of political and judicial power under Xi Jinping. Since 2013, that reform has been accompanied by contemporary anticorruption campaigns and the systematic restriction of civil and political rights. The article challenges the logic of ‘authoritarian legality’ as applied to China's contemporary reform and argues that, without reliable grassroots support, top-down supervisory reform will fail to achieve its stated aims, and judicial reform make no substantial progress. The article concludes that reinstating the separation of the Party and administration is the only way Chinese legal reform can make genuine progress under the existing regime.
Published Version
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