The Citizen as Spectator

Abstract

This chapter defends the claim that being-ruled — that is, the spectatorial engagement with politics characterized by involvement without participation — is a form of citizenship that is extremely prevalent within 21st-century conditions, yet nonetheless something that has been neglected by the major discourses constituting the contemporary study of democracy. Sections 2.2 through 2.4 discuss Aristotle's theory of being-ruled and argue that whereas Aristotle might have had good reason for giving the citizen-being-ruled only slight attention within his democratic theory, modern institutions and moral commitments ought to elevate the figure of the citizen-being-ruled to a position of primacy. Yet the relevance of being-ruled has not been appreciated by modern democratic theorists. Sections 2.5 through 2.8 review the most influential perspectives within contemporary democratic theory — including civic behavior research, pluralism, and deliberative democracy — and demonstrate the systematic neglect of the citizen-spectator. Finally, Section 2.9 addresses what it would mean to develop a democratic theory oriented around the experience of being-ruled and how the plebiscitary model defended in the subsequent chapters affords respect to the citizen-spectator.