THE CHOICE OF AN OBJECT OF STUDY IN THE THEORY OF LAW

Abstract

The relevance of the problem of choosing the object of study in the theory of law is determined by the need to tackle the debatable issue of pluralism in understanding of law. It is noted that one of the reasons for theoretical and legal pluralism on the concept of law is the lack of uniform criteria for identifying the object of study in the general theory of law. The situation with the concept of law in legal science, including with the pluralism of opinions, is considered largely as a result of the scientists and practitioners attitude described as first understand the law and then create a single concept of law. The fundamental research carried out in legal science and wide discussions on the concept of law are taken as positive; one of the parameters is the principle of separation of the object and subject of legal science. It is shown that when constructing a scientific theory of law, the primary question is the object of study, that is, the question of law itself as a special fragment of the real world, but not a disputable issue of the concept of law. However, in practice, when identifying the object of scientific knowledge in the general theory of law, scholars choose to study the most diverse fragments of the world, although they designate them with the same term law. Since various objects called law are subjected to scientific research, one cannot expect to derive a single concept of law. With regard to the analysis of the concept of law and the data of modern science, the following set of attributes for identifying law as an object of study in law theory is proposed for consideration: Law is a set of social norms enshrined in written language by the state and designed for people to interact with each other and with public authority such as state and other entities.