Abstract

The establishment of the Heisenberg-Schrodinger quantum mechanics in 1926 was undoubtedly the most important event m the history of twentieth-century science - for science itself, even if not for society. One might therefore suppose that the metaphysical conclusions associated with quantum mechanics are a major part of our present view of the world The purpose of this paper is to show that two of these conclusions - indeterminism, and the denial of independent reality to atomic properties - are not unique to quantum mechanics, but emerged as the culmination of historical trends begun m the nineteenth century It postulates cyclic oscillation between 'Romantic' and 'Realist' periods m science and culture, and ascribes a gradual breakdown of belief in determinism to debates about irreversibility. Albert Einstein's opposition to the 'Copenhagen Interpretation' of quantum mechanics was based on a preference for realism as much as a dislike for indeterminism, and the 'Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox' was a formidable challenge to subjectivist instrumentalism. Following the revival of realist interpretations m the 1950s, new experiments seem to have reconfirmed the subjectivist view But there is currently strong disagreement on what kind of subjectivism is scientifically legitimate; John Wheeler's version of the 'anthropic principle' and parapsychological explanations both conflict with the naive realism that has dominated the Western Intellectual tradition since the seventeenth century.

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