Abstract
In the contemporary cognitive science and philosophy of mind debate the definition of the ontology of the Self is difficult if not downright dubious. Thus, different theories aim to provide an account, especially where further neuroscientific research could be implemented. To this extent, the identity of the Self is suggested to be pinpointed by virtue of its specific set of mechanical features or brain functions, or it is considered the product of cognitive and conceptual capacities that build representations and narratives about ourselves. In this paper, I propose an alternative approach, based on the Spread Mind Theory (Manzotti, 2017a). Starting from the idea that the Self isn’t just an aprioristic or transcendental form, I claim, endorsing a Neo Naturalist approach, that our first-personal experience is identical to the external objects which, due to a physical relation, constitute the same experience. Thanks to an externalist explanation of the experience of the Self it is possible to avoid multiple ontologies, causal foundationalism, naïve materialism and questions begging about what we should explain. Clarifying the concept of the Self, as a bundle of relative objects which are identical with the experiences themselves, allows us to draw a physical ontology, based on the neutral (and natural) idea of relative existence rather than any posited concept of subjectivity.
Highlights
Specialty section: This article was submitted to Consciousness Research, a section of the journal Frontiers in Psychology
By relying on the premises set by SMT, I claim that it is possible to describe the identity bundle like the whole stream of objects experienced by an organism, because they are identical with the experience of that organism
Every time we perceive an object which has this particular shape, or color, or spatial placement, we are perceiving our hand; in the experimental set the synchronous stimulation between the rubber and the real hand is fundamental to elicit the result, because proprioceptive feedback actualizes the usual experience of the real hand with the visual perception of the rubber hand in front of us. In this way it is possible to integrate this unusual experience into our actual experience, creating the strange feeling of being an object that is very similar to our hand, but it is not our hand, it is not a part of our body. This strange experience, contrary to what neuroscientists would say, proves exactly what SMT and Neo Naturalist Model of the Self, claims: we are not our body, we are world, we are the objects which constitute our experiences, even in those particular cases in which we have unusual experiences that do not enter into our habitual category and that, for this reason, we label as illusory
Summary
Different theories aim to provide an account, especially where further neuroscientific research could be implemented. To this extent, the identity of the Self is suggested to be pinpointed by virtue of its specific set of mechanical features or brain functions, or it is considered the product of cognitive and conceptual capacities that build representations and narratives about ourselves. Clarifying the concept of the Self, as a bundle of relative objects which are identical with the experiences themselves, allows us to draw a physical ontology, based on the neutral (and natural) idea of relative existence rather than any posited concept of subjectivity
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