The Challenge of Co‑existence: ASEAN´s Relations with Vietnam in the 1990s

Abstract

The fall of Saigon in April 1975 was both a cause and a reflection of the changes in the pattern of international relations that had prevailed in Southeast Asia since the arrival of the colonial powers in the middle of the nineteenth century. For over a hundred years the region had been almost completely dominated by great power politics, as one extra-regional major actor after another sought, sometimes achieved, but always failed to establish on a permanent basis, its own preferred order or framework for the conduct of international relations in the region. But, with the American failure in Vietnam and the consequent reduction of the Ameri can role and commitments in Southeast Asia, it was clear that while external power involvement would remain a fact of life for Southeast Asians, no single extra regional major actor would be in a position to exert a predominant influence over the region and the pursuit of the regional states' own interests, demands and aspi rations would have a much more significant impact upon international politics. The most important set of relationships among the regional states is that between the members of the non-communist Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the one hand, and the communist Indochinese countries, namely Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, on the other. In these relationships, the key issue is the one raised by the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978. For, at stake is not only the future of Kampuchea itself, but also the question of power distribution both in Indochina and in Southeast Asia as a whole. This so-called Kampuchean conflict was brought about by a combination of trends and forces. At one level, it emanated from a crisis of legitimacy in Kam puchea itself, where the Pol Pot regime between 1975 and 1978 sought to consoli date its power through the use of violence, both internal and external. At another level, the conflict stemmed from historical and ethnic antagonisms, geopolitical rivalries, doctrinal differences, and clashes of aspirations in certain dyadic rela tionships among regional (or quasi-regional) states, namely, between China and Vietnam, Vietnam and Kampuchea, and Vietnam and Thailand. At the third level, the conflict was caused by the triangular relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union and China; all three see the distribution of power in Indochina and Southeast Asia as an important, if not a key, issue affecting their security interests, and consequently each seeks to extend its influence in the region or at least to deny the others the opportunity of doing so.