Abstract

This paper views America's 'drones-first' counter-insurgency effort in Pakistan through the lens of Merton's theory of the unintended consequences of purposive action. It also references Beck’s Risk Society thesis, America’s Revolution in Military Affairs doctrine, Toft’s theory of isomorphic learning, Langer’s theory of mindfulness, Highly Reliable Organisations theory and the social construction of technology (SCOT) argument. With reference to Merton’s theory, the CIA-directed armed Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) campaign has manifest functions, latent functions and latent dysfunctions. Measured against numbers of suspected insurgents killed, the campaign can be judged a success. Measured against the level of collateral damage or the state of US-Pakistan relations, the campaign can be judged a failure. Values determine the choice of metrics. Because RPV operations eliminate risk to American service personnel, and because this is popular with both US citizens and politicians, collateral damage (the killing of civilians) is not considered a policy-changing dysfunction. However, the latent dysfunctions of America's drones-first policy may be so great as to undermine that policy's intended manifest function – to make a net contribution to the War on Terror. In Vietnam the latent dysfunctions of Westmoreland’s attritional war undermined America’s policy of containment. Vietnam holds a lesson for the Obama administration.

Highlights

  • Like air-launched cruise missiles, Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) are ‘arms-length’ weapons systems that mitigate the risks inherent in armed conflict

  • Those connected with CIA operations in Pakistan could find themselves facing the same ‘court of public opinion’ as that faced by Vietnam veterans

  • Limiting ourselves to the specific type of armed RPV operation that is the subject of this paper, there is the possibility that CIA-directed RPV operations over sovereign territory will so delegitimise and de-stabilise the elected government of Pakistan that it is less able to withstand the threat posed by home-grown terrorist movements like the 35,000-strong Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (Boyle, 2013)

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Summary

Introduction

Like air-launched cruise missiles, RPVs are ‘arms-length’ weapons systems that mitigate the risks inherent in armed conflict. “[S]tatistics yield a civilian fatality rate that ranges from 15 percent to more than twice that” says Deri (2012: 7) It is claimed collateral damage persuades some to join terrorist organisations. Towards the end of the Vietnam War, soldiers home on leave were sometimes challenged by those who disagreed with the war, triggering defensiveness (Gitell, 2007) Those connected with CIA operations in Pakistan could find themselves facing the same ‘court of public opinion’ as that faced by Vietnam veterans. Limiting ourselves to the specific type of armed RPV operation that is the subject of this paper, there is the possibility that CIA-directed RPV operations over sovereign territory will so delegitimise and de-stabilise the elected government of Pakistan that it is less able to withstand the threat posed by home-grown terrorist movements like the 35,000-strong Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (Boyle, 2013). The CIA engages in targeted killing in both Pakistan and Somalia (Boyle, 2013)

A Mertonian analysis of the use of armed RPVs in Pakistan
Findings
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