The Case for Psychological Quietism: Wittgensteinian Propaedeutics in Smedslund’s Writings

Abstract

I present Smedslund’s and Wittgenstein’s different ways of conducting conceptual analysis as reflecting two different conceptions of language and argue that when it comes to the nature of language, Smedslund has it wrong and Wittgenstein has it right. However, due to what appears to be an instrumentalist shift in Smedslund’s thinking, it seems possible to adapt his conceptual approach to Wittgenstein’s conception of language. Likening conceptual analysis to cartography, I suggest that we view the two as using different methods of projection. I then go on to argue that the project of mapping psychological concepts has a claim to universality, at least partially, since there seem to be psychological facts and principles, common to human beings, that restrain the ways in which human psychology can be conceptualised—a point made by both Smedslund and Wittgenstein. After this, I lay out Wittgenstein’s philosophical quietism and demonstrate in what ways Smedslund’s a-theoretical view of psychology parallels it. I emphasise that quietism, in both philosophy and psychology, is to be conceived of as a propaedeutic. Finally, I suggest that Smedslund’s bricoleur model for psychological practice is an example of the quietist ethos. This brings forth the ethical dimension of quietism, which is the renunciation of dogma.