The Bush Doctrine Revisited: The 2006 National Security Strategy of the USA

Abstract

In its 2006 National Security Strategy, the USA reaffirms the controversial doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence as crucial in the ''war on terror'' proclaimed after the attacks of 9/11. But it does not provide a detailed examination of pre-emption. The questions left open in the 2002 US National Security Strategy as to what will trigger pre-emptive action, when action against non-State actors will be permissible and what degree of force will be proportionate in pre-emptive action are still unre- solved. The promise that ''The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured and the cause just'' does not offer much in the way of specific guidance. It is very striking that in this context, the US strategy makes no reference to inter- national law or to the role of the UN Security Council. The other main focus of the strategy is on the ''promotion of democracy'', but it does not go so far as to assert any legal right to use force for this purpose, and it makes only passing reference to humanitarian intervention. The EU 2003 Security Strategy provides a marked con- trast in that it does not adopt the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence, does not expressly identify ''rogue States'' and does profess respect for international law and for the role of the UN. Other States have not generally shown themselves willing to accept a Bush doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence. They agree that there are new threats facing the world from international terrorists and the danger of prolifer- ation of weapons of mass destruction, but the 2005 World Summit showed clearly that there is no general acceptance of pre-emptive action. Moreover, the International Court of Justice still follows a cautious approach to self-defence. The 2006 National Security Strategy largely reaffirms the doctrines of the earlier 2002 Strategy, but whereas the focus in the 2002 Strategy was on the threat posed by Iraq and North Korea; attention has now shifted to Iran and Syria, accused of being State sponsors of terror by Hizbollah and Al-Qaida. The article ends with a discussion of the recent conflict in Lebanon: this raised the crucial question whether the war on terror gave Israel a wide right to use force, even a pre-emptive right. The conflict highlights dramatically the practical significance of the divisions on the scope of the law of self-defence with regard to action against non-State actors, pre-emption and proportionality.