No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security Policy, by Thomas M. Nichols

Abstract

Thomas M. Nichols No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security Policy Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. 232 pp., $39.95 (cloth) ISBN: 978-0-8122-4566-0Based on data for late 2013, United States' nuclear arsenal includes an estimated 7400 warheads; of these, 4650 ready for use, with an additional 2700 awaiting destruction.1 What utility do these weapons have? This question lies at centre of No Use, as Thomas Nichols of US Naval War College considers what role nuclear force can and should play in US national security strategy. Nichols advances a compelling argument that challenges prevailing assumptions about nuclear force and its role in US national security policy. The United States, Nichols argues, should abandon its Cold War outlook completely in favour of its existing unspoken nuclear toward Russia and China of minimum deterrence (173). No Use makes an important contribution to our understanding of past and present US nuclear strategy, as well as offering well-reasoned recommendations regarding future role of nuclear weapons in US national security policy.At core of Nichols' argument lies a paradox: although decades have passed since collapse of Soviet Union, US nuclear policy continues to be dominated by Cold War thinking. To demonstrate ongoing predominance of Cold War interpretations, Nichols briefly explores history of US nuclear strategy, illustrating predominant assumption that nuclear weapons were (and continue to be) a successful deterrent. While post-Cold War administrations have undertaken nuclear posture reviews (NPRs), these reviews have not precipitated any concrete change in US strategy. Instead, policymakers have retained an approach of favouring the devil we know rather than overhauling policy (81-82). In absence of significant change resulting from NPRs, US post-Cold War nuclear doctrine retains Cold War thinking, continuing to be a diluted version of Mutually Assured Destruction. As a result, United States is more prepared to respond to a nuclear threat from Russia or China-the easy scenarios to plan for, according to Nichols-than to a more probable, but less predictable, threat posed by a nuclear-armed smaller state or non-state actor (55-56).The challenges confronting United States and its allies today, however, not same as those posed by Soviet Union in past. While this seems obvious, No Use makes it clear that US nuclear thinking today draws no such distinction. Instead of reconsidering role of nuclear weapons, policymakers continue to recycle old assumptions, hoping that deterrence will work again (if indeed it did in first place). Existing US policy assumes that small states are subject to same supposedly iron laws of deterrence that constrain large powers (132). This poses a number of questions. Can a small state be deterred by threat of nuclear retaliation? Is United States willing to retaliate, and if so, how? Nichols addresses a lengthy list of issues that would face US government, including co-location of civilian and nuclear targets and potential damage to neigh- bouring allies. …