The Budapest memorandum: lessons and unfulfilled expectations on Ukraine’s path to joining NATO

Abstract

The Budapest Memorandum for Ukraine (the official name is the Memorandum on Security Guarantees in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) was the result of negotiations on the disposal of the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, its nuclear weapons were deployed or stored in four of the fifteen successor states: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. This raised important questions of security and protection, as well as command and control; and Moscow and Washington agreed that Russia should be the sole nuclear successor to the Soviet Union. The United States recognized that it would have to offer security guarantees to Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to persuade them to hand over their Soviet-made nuclear weapons to Russia and join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. In coordination with London and Moscow, Washington drew up a package of security guarantees. These assurances were set out in the Budapest memorandums regarding Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. France and China – the other nuclear-weapon states recognized by the NPT—have offered their own guarantees unilaterally.
 The Budapest Memorandum on Ukraine confirmed the obligation to respect the independence, sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine (according to the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) of 1975); to refrain from the threat of force or its use against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, as well as from any use of weapons against Ukraine, except in cases of self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; and refrain from economic coercion against Ukraine in accordance with the Final Act of the CSCE. The memorandum also reiterated the positive and negative security guarantees provided to all non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT.
 This scientific article is devoted to the study of the significance of the Budapest Memorandum for Ukraine and its influence on the possibility of the country joining NATO. The historical context of the conclusion of the memorandum is studied, the key obligations are determined and the consequences of their violation are analyzed. Special attention is paid to the analysis of the current security situation in Ukraine, in particular due to the annexation of Crimea and the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine. The article examines the prospects of Ukraine’s membership in NATO and suggests ways to resolve unfulfilled expectations and restore the international community’s trust in the commitments made within the framework of the memorandum.