Abstract
In comparative perspective, the control of constitutionality is one of the most apparent faces of the relations between judiciary - through Superior Courts - executive and legislative branches. In judicial review, Courts interact with parliaments and governments affecting decision-making and interfering in the development and implementation of policies. In Brazil, between 1988 and 2014, 65% of the Direct Actions of Unconstitutionality (ADI) challenged state rules, not federal ones. In the same period, approximately 25% of all cases were proposed by State Governors or State Legislatures. In spite of the recent improvement in the literature examining the relationship between judiciary and legislative branches in Brazil at the federal level, an empirical gap still exists when sub-national controversies are focused. How does the Brazilian Supreme Court decide cases about state rules? What are its impacts on sub-national policies? To discuss the first question, this paper empirically analyses all ADI cases proposed against state rules and their decision patterns compared to other classes of cases. Despite the need of further research, the central claim is that the existing differences on outcomes between state and federal issues places the Supreme Court as a potential veto point against state majorities forward the interests of the Union, and also as an actor that can bring informational gains to decision making, with impacts on the country’s federative organization.
Published Version
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