The Berlin Group of logical empiricism

Abstract

This volume offers a very welcome in-depth look at a particular group of the philosophers associated with the Berlin Society for Empirical Philosophy (from 1931: Scientific Philosophy). The editors stress that these two groupings differ and call only the former the ‘‘Berlin Group for scientific philosophy’’ (though not all contributors observe this distinction): Hans Reichenbach, Walter Dubislav, Kurt Grelling, Paul Oppenheim and Carl Gustav Hempel. Parts I and II provide introductions and historical context for the group as a whole and Parts III–VI consider highly specific aspects of the work of its members but for two overview papers on Grelling and Hempel (by the editors written separately). To appreciate the volume best, it may be helpful to distinguish between the straightforward historical investigations and the more revisionist historiographical contributions, the latter much smaller in number but prominently placed by one of the editors. While the former will be applauded unreservedly for enriching and deepening our understanding of the philosophers discussed, the latter certainly will—and perhaps was intended—to provoke dissent. I begin with an outline of the former before turning to the latter. Part II provides deep historical background in Helmut Pulte’s ‘‘J.F. Fries’ Philosophy of Science, the New Friesian School and the Berlin Group: On Divergent Scientific Philosophies, Difficult Relations and Missed Opportunities’’. Pulte fulfils his agenda with a very accessible account of the philosophy of science that Fries inherited from Kant, its reception by both the New Friesians (Leonard Nelson) and the Berlin Group and the relations between these two groups (Grelling, Dubislav and Reichenbach had associations with Nelson). Special attention is paid to the critical reception of the special theory of relativity by the New Friesians (Bernays) and the debates over truth in geometry which led Grelling to switch his