The Berlin Crises of 1948–49 and 1958–62

Abstract

The Berlin crises provide an interesting prism through which to view the changes of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO’s) first decade; this is partly because, in general, crises in the international system provide points of reference that increase our understanding of longer-term trends. The Berlin crises are particularly interesting for several reasons. First, the historical incidence of their occurrence in 1948–9 and 1958–62 bounds the first ten years of the Atlantic Alliance, allowing temporal comparisons relevant to NATO’s development. Second, Berlin was a frequent source of friction and the most likely cause of war between the Warsaw Pact and NATO throughout the decade. As a result, Berlin was the principal planning contingency and the effects of Allied policy carried considerable significance. However, the chief reason for which the Berlin crises are interesting in analysing NATO’s first decade is that both crises had a catalytic effect on the way the Western states viewed issues of their security. Both Berlin crises engendered structures and plans redefining NATO security. It is the purpose of this chapter to compare and contrast the two crises as an approach to analysing NATO’s first decade.