The Berlin Crises, France, and the Atlantic Alliance, 1947–62: From Integration to Disintegration

Abstract

The Berlin crises of 1948–49 and of 1958–61 have both been of decisive influence on the formulation of French security policy. Yet they worked in opposite ways. The first crisis crystallised French fears, inducing France to seek American protection within the framework of a formal alliance. The second Berlin crisis, as seen from a French perspective, served to emphasise the serious shortcomings of the Atlantic security organisation which was thought to be in dire need of reform (see Figure 5.1). In the first instance as in the second, the Berlin crises were catalysts in the shaping of French defence policy: they started a process either of rapprochement between France and her Western Allies, or of distancing France from the Atlantic community. Each time the active agent was the relative strength of France. In 1948 France seemed a weak state, threatened both from the outside and from within. Ten years later, she had recovered; she wanted to have atomic weapons, and she wanted to be considered and treated as an equal parter. The two Berlin crises illustrate the stormy marriage of France and NATO which evolved in ten years from honeymoon to separation, never actually reaching divorce.KeywordsForeign PolicyForeign MinisterNorth Atlantic Treaty OrganisationWestern PowerFrench TerritoryThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.