The Benefits to Inquiry Argument

Abstract

In this chapter I develop and defend an important argument in the epistemology of disagreement literature, initially gestured at by Catherine Z. Elgin (2010). This argument advances the idea that there are possible future epistemic benefits to be gained if an agent continues to develop and defend her beliefs in the face of peer disagreement, particularly within research contexts. These potential epistemic benefits justify a researcher remaining steadfast in the face of peer disagreement. After outlining the broad contours of the argument, I explore some empirical evidence in support of Elgin’s claim. For instance, I examine an economic model developed by Scott Page which demonstrates that in certain scenarios, peer disagreement tends to enhance epistemic practices such as problem solving and prediction making. I also outline some ideas found in psychology regarding bias and motivated reasoning which also lend empirical support to Elgin. I believe that this is one of the most promising arguments for non-conciliationism, albeit a limited version of it since it only applies in research context and as such it will be my focus for the rest of this book.