Abstract
We study solution concepts for nontransferable utility games according to which the coalition structure and the payoff allocations are simultaneously determined. The steady bargaining set is a refinement of the Zhou bargaining set, which is included in the Mas‐Colell bargaining set. We prove the nonemptiness and partial efficiency of the steady bargaining set for at least one coalition structure under the restrictive non‐crossing condition. Without this condition, the Zhou bargaining set may be empty and the Mas‐Colell bargaining set is nonempty but may not be efficient.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
