The B‐1 decision: How Much is too little?

Abstract

In 1977, the Carter Admimstration cancelled the B‐1 bomber program. This paper assesses the impact of that decision on national security, within the context of the overall American offensive/defensive posture and the US/ Soviet balance. It is the author's contention that the Administration, in reducing the manned bombers to secondary status, is abandoning the Strategic Triad of bombers, submarine‐launched missiles, and land‐based missiles which has been the basis of our national defense posture for 20 years. Further, the deterioration of the land‐based missile capability, a result of the increasing vulnerability of the Minuteman force to Soviet strikes and the hostility of the Administration to the follow‐on mobile MX program, means that in the 1980s we must rely essentially on a Strategic Monad—the submarine fleet. Absolutely accurate “hairline analysis” could still protect us, but should such calculations fail, should unknown factors enter—then a catastrophe unparalleled in the nation's history could occur.