THE ARMY, THE STATE, AND THE ‘RAWLINGS REVOLUTION’ IN GHANA

Abstract

SINCE Independence in 1957, the masses of Ghana have been hoping for something dramatic on the political scene; they have been hoping for an earthshaking change in the foundation of the power structure which has been ruling their lives, for an end to the seemingly endless cycle of poverty, deprivation and want. They have been hoping for something which will remove their anxieties, guarantee the future of their children, and fulfil their aspirations. In a way, they have been hoping for something which will give them a sense of selffulfilment. It was hoped that Nkrumah would achieve this, but in spite of commendable efforts, the dream did not materialize. Will it work this time? To what extent has the 4 June 'Rawlings Revolution' ushered in the new era claimed by the coup leaders? Has Ghana at long last hitched on the vehicle which will, hopefully, translate the hopes and aspirations of the broad masses of the people into reality? Or is this just a moment in the dialectic, a temporary phase in the intense struggle between different fractions of the petty bourgeoisie to gain control over the state apparatus and redirect resources more beneficially to their sectional interests? Has the exit of Rawlings and his colleagues in the last week of September 1979 meant an end to the Rawlings phenomenon? What meaning should be attached to Rawlings's intervention within the constellation of class forces within Ghanaian politics? The emergence of Rawlings on the Ghanaian political scene was as dramatic as his exit in late September 1979, rivalling in sense of drama only the extravaganzas of the James Bond films. How else could one characterize the episode of a man who only two weeks before was being held in a condemned cell for leading a section of junior officers in an unsuccessful attempt at insurrection, yet manages to escape to lead this time a successful one against the incumbent junta of senior army officers? Not only that, in a move characterized as a 'cleaning-up' operation, the new junta executes eight senior army, air force and naval officers, including three former Heads of State, for 'crimes against the state', sends hundreds of 'corrupt' officers and civilians to long prison sentences, dismisses a number of top senior civil servants and police officers (shaking the foundations of petty bourgeois power), and yet allows scheduled elections to go ahead as planned ten days after the seizure of power. Three months later, amidst