The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law

Abstract

The prevailing form of international cooperation in 20th century, known as liberal internationalism, is increasingly under attack. Based on multilateral treaties, often coupled to formal organizations, liberal internationalism has drawn fire from many quarters. Some critics argue that international organizations threaten national sovereignty and ought to be curtailed. Others claim that globalization and rise of NGOs are eclipsing state power. In response, transgovernmentalists argue that while that liberal internationalism is dying, state is here to stay. Much contemporary international cooperation is not international at all: rather, it is occurring among discrete, specialized domestic agencies. These are expanding rapidly, particularly in regulation. Proponents believe that networks are the blueprint for international architecture of 21st century. This article assesses future of international cooperation by examining transgovernmental networks and evaluating their relationship to liberal internationalism. My central claim is that networks are a significant development in international law, but one likely to supplement and strengthen, rather than supplant, liberal internationalism. I make four subsidiary claims. First, an empirical examination of three networks - in securities, competition, and environmental regulation - demonstrates that networks are active and growing. Second, I argue three factors are driving evolution of networks: expansion of domestic regulation, increased economic interdependence, and technological innovation. Third, while regulatory enforcement has been a key driver of networks, networks also promote export of regulatory rules and practices from major powers to weaker states, which in turn promotes policy convergence. I offer a theory of this process which builds upon insights of network economics. Fourth, and most importantly, cooperation that networks foster and convergence that they facilitate have important implications for liberal internationalism. Networks smooth negotiation of new treaties. They act as gap-fillers where treaties are politically precluded. And by building bureaucratic capacity, networks can improve domestic regulation and thereby enhance treaty compliance and effectiveness. Put differently, there are good reasons to believe networks will make treaties more effective by making governments more effective.