The application of military doctrine to counterinsurgency (COIN) operations: A British perspective

Abstract

This article sets out to establish the links between classical military doctrine as applied to general war and the empirical development of any doctrine with regard to insurgency and counterinsurgency. The theme is developed by covering both the attrition theory and the maneuver theory of warfare in outline, and then by examining the essential tenets of maneuver warfare in detail and applying these tenets to the experience gained by the United Kingdom in countering insurgency. The scope and role of the newly fashionable “information warfare” in counterinsurgency operations is examined, followed by an assessment of the important task of integrating all the separate aspects of these operations into an overall plan of action for a counterinsurgency campaign. The author concludes that there is a clear and positive link between classical doctrine for the application of force in general war and doctrine that can be usefully applied in counterinsurgency operations.