Lessons from India's Counterinsurgency Campaign in Jammu and Kashmir

Abstract

Abstract : With the majority of U.S. Army operations over the past decade focused on counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, there is value in the study of other contemporary campaigns to increase the Army's depth of understanding. India has conducted a COIN campaign in Jammu and Kashmir, also referred to as Kashmir, since 1989. A conflict that began as a nationalist movement to create an autonomous Kashmiri state has evolved into a conflict now focused on extremist Muslim groups. Operating in the context of fighting an insurgency on land disputed between two nuclear powers, India has adapted its operational approach over the conflict's long history. The long-term commitment to the campaign in Jammu and Kashmir offers the U.S. Army a relevant, contemporary case study on COIN operations. The historical principles for COIN offered in Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency serve as a lens for examining India's campaign. The U.S. Army can draw four lessons from India's evolving operational approach. First, India's actions demonstrate that legitimacy cannot be assumed by the COIN force, but is determined by the populace in question. Second, the campaign demonstrates that the military's goal should be to work itself into the background, and allow the political factors to retain their primacy. Third, Kashmir also shows that security under the rule of law requires that security forces are held accountable for their actions, and that this process is as transparent as practical. Finally, the COIN efforts in Kashmir serve as another reminder of the long term commitment required in order to be successful. These lessons from Kashmir provide a contextual basis for continuing to identify and pursue sound principles for COIN operations in the future.