The Appearance of Skepticism: Possibility, Conceivability and Infinite Ascent

Sorin Bangu

doi:10.1017/can.2021.6

Abstract

AbstractThe paper articulates a novel strategy against external world skepticism. It shows that a modal assumption of the skeptical argument cannot be justified.

Highlights

In proposing a skeptical scenario, the Skeptic challenges us to contemplate a situation in which things appear to be the way they do and yet nothing is as it appears to be
By appealing to the venerable Conceivability Principle—that, roughly, “conceivability entails possibility”—the Skeptic may claim that the statement “It is conceivable that one is the subject of a sks”23 entails SKP-0 (“It is possible that one is the subject of a sks”)
The Skeptic’s idea is to claim that SKP-0 holds because I, her opponent, am unable to rule out the possibility described in it; that is, because I cannot conceive reasons against the possibility that I am the subject of a sks

Summary

Introduction

In proposing a skeptical scenario, the Skeptic challenges us to contemplate a situation in which things appear to be the way they do and yet nothing is as it appears to be. The challenge to SK-1 will be indirect since my concern will be the following modal proposition: The focus on this proposition—in which I take modality to be metaphysical7—is motivated by the observation that a most natural rendering of the first premise of the skeptical argument would be “Assuming that you accept that it is possible that you are the subject of a sks, you are not justified to believe that you are not in such a situation”; or, “Assuming SKP-0, SK-1.”8 So, one wonders, what happens if I do not make this assumption? In what follows, this is not a matter of exceptionless principle, but applies only to what we called above bizarre propositions (like SKP-0).16 To close this argument, it is crucial to realize that the position we start from is by no means one in which I should believe SKP-0 (by default, as it were), and I need to justify why I doubt it. With only a few but notable exceptions, this proposition has not been investigated, even though it is a modal claim and there has been substantial debate around the justification of modal claims.

Positive conceivability

The Default strategy

Further clarifications and concluding remarks