Skepticism as a Theory of Knowledge

Abstract

Skepticism about the external world may very well be correct, so the question is in order: what theory of knowledge flows from skepticism itself? The skeptic can give a relatively simple and intuitive account of knowledge by identifying it with indubitable certainty. Our everyday 'I know that p' claims, which typically are part of practical projects, deploy the ideal of knowledge to make assertions closely related to, but weaker than, knowledge claims. The truth of such claims is consistent with skepticism; various other vexing problems don't arise. In addition, even if no claim about the world outside my mind can be more probable than its negation, the project of pure scientific research remains well motivated. Epistemology is largely a response to skepticism. A subtext of virtually every theory of knowledge has been to show how knowledge is possible or, at the least, to avoid an account that delivers us unto the skeptic. Yet skepticism remains robust after 2,500 years. The question is surely in order: what if skepticism is correct? How bad would that be? And what sort of epistemology flows from skepticism? A tortured epistemology has resulted from the conviction that a theory of knowledge must explain how knowledge is possible. If its consequences turn out not to be so terrible as we feared, and it yields an intuitive and useful account of knowledge, then skepticism itself becomes an attractive option in epistemology. This paper will support that alternative. In any case, it is unlikely that skepticism should have proved so durable if it reveals nothing of importance about knowledge; and we can hardly expect to learn what something teaches so long as we doggedly resist it. To learn what it teaches, therefore, I propose to capitulate to skepticism. The skepticism that will concern me is three-fold: the Problem of the External World, the Problem of Induction, and the Problem of the Past-we don't know there is a world outside our minds, we know nothing about the future, and we don't know there is a past. (The area of traditional epistemology these constitute might be called 'The Problem of the External World and Its Suburbs.') I focus on these problems because each of them is of particular concern to science, and because all are motivated by forceful arguments.' Skepticism remains unalarming, of course, if it merely insists that we don't