The Anglo‐Najd treaty of December 1915

Abstract

On the eve of the First World War, Ibn Saud, founder of the present kingdom of Saudi Arabia, was probably the most powerful ruler in the Arabian peninsula. Since his seizure of Riyadh in 1902, he had consolidated his authority in Najd in central Arabia and successfully defended his territory in numerous encounters with the forces of his hereditary enemy to the north, Ibn Rashid, the amir of Jabal Shammar. In May 1913 Ibn Saud had ousted the Turks from the valuable coastal province of Hasa, thereby gaining direct access to the Persian Gulf. And in May 1914 he had concluded a treaty with the Ottoman government in which the latter recognized his position in Najd and in Hasa in exchange for a nominal Turkish suzerainty.1 Notwithstanding this agreement, in June 1914 Captain William Shakespear, a former British political agent at Kuwait who had travelled widely in Arabia, reported that dissatisfaction with the Ottoman government was widespread in Najd, and that Turkish prestige had plummeted as a result of military defeats in Libya and in the Balkans. Indeed, according to Shakespear, Ibn Saud had recently become head of a loose anti-Ottoman confederation or alliance of most of the major rulers in the Arabian peninsula, including the Sharif Husayn of the Hijaz, the Idrisi of Asir, and the Imam Yahya of the Yemen. Ibn Rashid was, however, not included, as he was linked tightly with the Turks. The basis of the alliance, Shakespear noted, was the understanding that the chiefs would settle their own differences peaceably and that, in the event of an Ottoman attack against any one of them, all would combine for resistance and mutual help. Ibn Saud's stature was illustrated by the fact that 'The other sheikhs of the Arab alliance refer all kinds of matters to Bin Saud for his advice, more especially those affecting their relations with the Porte.'2 Although Shakespear undoubtedly exaggerated the closeness of the ties binding the various Arab rulers, it is clear that in 1914 Ibn Saud's prestige was great and his position in Arabia was strong. When Turkey entered the war at the end of October 1914, the Ottoman government made strenuous efforts to reconcile Ibn Saud and Ibn Rashid. After years of trying to control Arabia through divide-and-rule tactics, the Turks reversed this policy by attempting to integrate the rival chiefs into the Ottoman war effort, either in the Egyptian or in the Mesopotamian campaign. But the enmity between the two rulers was too deep to permit their collaboration. Besides, Ibn Saud had no intention of actively supporting the Turks in the conflict, because his newly acquired ports on the Persian Gulf coast were vulnerable to British bombardment. Moreover, Ibn Saud viewed the Turks as the most important threat to his independence, and an Ottoman victory would only strengthen their hold on Arabia. Indeed, before 1914 Ibn Saud had made numerous efforts to open relations with Britain in an attempt to bolster his position against the Turks. Consequently the prospect of