A Kingdom of Possibility

Abstract

Introduction The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the largest country in the Middle East. Lying within the heart of the Arabian Peninsula, it borders the Red Sea to the west; Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait to the north; the Persian Gulf, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates to the east; and Oman and Yemen to the south. The foundation of Saudi Arabia may be largely credited to two main historical figures who lived in the first half of the eighteenth century. The first figure, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, was a devout Islamic scholar and religious activist who fervently condemned the increasing tendencies of local peoples toward idolatrous practices. He preached the need for a return to stricter adherence to the original principles of Islam, based on devotion to the doctrine of the ‘absolute unity of God’ as passed through, and enunciated by, the witness of God’s word, Prophet Muhammad (Rentz). In present-day Saudi Arabia, reverence to Prophet Muhammad’s divine revelations and divinely appointed role, as accentuated by al-Wahhab, remains inscribed on the national flag (fig. 1), which states: “there is no god but Allah; Muhammad is the messenger of God”. Figure 1: The flag of Saudi Arabia Although initially met with opposition, al-Wahhab’s eventual encounter in 1744 with the ruler of the Najd town of Diriyah, Muhammad ibn Saud, led to “the drastic change in the course of Arabian history” (Rentz 16), after both men pledged an oath and alliance in pursuit of a successful religious, political, and military expansion campaign that saw Diriyah become the first Saudi state and original home to the Al-Saud dynasty (MoFA). It was not until 1932, however, that the nation-state of Saudi Arabia was officially formed, establishing Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud (often known as Ibn Saud) as the first officially recognised ruling monarch and patriarch of the modern House of Saud. In only a few short decades since the date of unification, the once poor desert landscape comprised of rivalling nomadic tribes has undergone astonishing transformations, making the present-day unified Kingdom a key strategic regional and international actor within world politics, and a major economical, technological, and military power and rival. In addition to being a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), for example, Saudi Arabia is also an active and founding member of international organisations such as the United Nations, the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (OAS). Notably, Saudi Arabia’s influence and eminence in the international arena specifically pertains to its leading role within OPEC, given that Saudi Arabia’s command economy is largely petroleum-based. Here, Saudi Arabia is the “largest generator of net oil export revenue” for OPEC, and the “largest OPEC crude oil exporter” (Statista); in 2022, Saudi Arabia’s oil export revenues totalled US$311 billion (Statista). Unsurprisingly, the House of Saud is the wealthiest royal family in the world, worth an estimated US$1.4 trillion (Hieu), a figure four times the combined wealth of billionaires Elon Musk (worth an estimated US$236.1 billion) and Bill Gates (worth an estimated US$119.7 billion). The combined wealth of the House of Saud also significantly surpasses the worth of the renowned British royal family, whose combined wealth pales in comparison at an estimated US$28 billion (Hieu; Srinivasan). Arguably, the net worth of the House of Saud not only financially ranks them among the top tier of elites, but also makes them one of the most powerful royal families in the world (Hieu). Presently, the nation remains an absolute monarchy under a Sharia legal system, in accordance with Islamic law as principally derived from the Quran (holy book) and Sunnah (the saying, traditions, and practices of Prophet Muhammad). Absolute monarchism denotes that no political parties or national elections are permitted, and that the reigning monarch executes predominant control over legislative and internal civil affairs. Comparatively, a constitutional monarchy such as that of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland denotes that the powers held by the reigning monarch in their position as head of state are more symbolic and ceremonial. As such, the House of Windsor often rely significantly on consumerist culture as a means for maintaining their monarchical legitimacy, and relevance and ‘celebrity’, particularly within its Commonwealth settler nations (Randell-Moon). The rule of the House of Saud has often been controversially labelled by critics as totalitarian (Bandow), particularly for the limited freedoms of expression and association afforded to its citizens, where “controversy is discouraged, and conformity is encouraged” (Faksh & Hendrickson 1171); as Faksh and Hendrickson (1171) surmise, “the system offers little scope for the expression of competing views, much less for acting on them”. Nonetheless, the prevailing system of government in Saudi Arabia, currently under the patronage of King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, led to the creation of one of the most uniquely curated sovereign powers, whose rise and affluence is, in part, largely testament to the loyalty of its citizenry to its monarchy. The Saudi government provides its citizens with a range of benefits, including exemption from personal income tax, free education (including tertiary) and healthcare, as well as government-subsidised handouts. In 2018, for example, King Salman ordered the government to pay around 1.18 million Saudis working in the public sector 1,000 Saudi Riyals (SAR) (approximately US$266) per month to “offset increasing costs of living” (Perper); for Alawwad (cited in Perper), “the allocation of 50 billion Riyals (approximately US$13 billion) for this decree indicates the leadership’s concern for the people’s comfort and quality of living. The modern-day rule of Saudi royalty may be seen as reminiscent of the foundational traditions and customs on which the nation was formed, “much like a sheikh of a tribe who is in close touch with the concerns of his tribesmen and keeps those concerns in balance” (Faksh & Hendrickson 1171). The Saudi monarchy that has thus emerged may be seen to radically differ from Western concepts of the institution: “no Sun King, no pomp elevating the monarch far above the common breed, not even a crown or a throne” (Rentz 15). This article discusses the growth of the House of Saud – from nomadic warriors principally guided by the foundations of Islam to entrepreneurs determined to bridge the gap in the Kingdom between tradition and modernity, conservatism and social liberalism, nationalism and internationalism. The Founding Monarchs, Black Gold, and Foreign Relations Prior to the official unification of Saudi Arabia in 1932, the House of Saud considered the UK a close ally, particularly with regard to British support received in relation to the defeat of the Ottoman conquest in the Arabia Peninsula (Nonneman). During World War I, for example, Ibn Saud (then ruler of Najd and al-Ahsa, and later founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) signed the 1915 Treaty of Darin (or ‘Anglo-Saudi’ Treaty) with the British government, granting the regions under Ibn Saud’s rule the status of a British protectorate (Wilkinson; Dahlan). In the years that followed the signing of the treaty, Britain also granted Ibn Saud “a loan of [₤]20,000 and a shipment of arms”, as well as a monthly stipend of ₤5,000 from 1917 to 1924 (Nonneman 640). This stipend was granted as a token for the “consolidation of the new Saudi polity, through military means and acts of patronage and generosity towards both [Ibn Saud’s] supporters and many of his vanquished foes” (Nonneman 640). In 1927, the Treaty of Darin was supplanted by the Treaty of Jeddah, which affirmed the British government’s recognition of absolute independence of Ibn Saud’s rulership as King of Najd and Hejaz and its dependencies – the ‘dual Kingdom’ later unified and renamed to Saudi Arabia (Nonneman). Undoubtedly, the discovery of ‘black gold’ in Saudi Arabia had, and continues to have, significant influence on the nation’s identify formation, the extent of its socioeconomic growth, and the Saudi monarchy’s political prowess. Given the strength of the alliance between the state under Ibn Saud and the UK in the early twentieth century, Ibn Saud awarded a UK-based company its first petroleum concession in 1923; after four years, however, the company was unable to strike any oil and the contract was not renewed. A second sixty-year concession that was awarded to the US-based Standard Oil Company of California (now known as the Arabian American Oil Company, or ARAMCO) in 1933 would, however, not only mark a significant turning-point for the Saudi economy, but also for Saudi foreign relations thereafter (Al-Farsy). According to Al-Farsy (45), Ibn Saud’s “concession to the American firm at that time represented a major break with what was virtually a British monopoly of petroleum concession in that part of the world”. Notably, the House of Saud also received ‘advantageous’ offers from both Japan and Germany for oil ‘diplomacy’ in the late 1930s (Al-Farsy). Ibn Saud believed, however, that the Axis Powers were instead “motivated by political considerations” (Al-Farsy 47) and were “aware of the strategic value of the Middle East, situated as it was on the lines of communication with her new European partners” (Katakura 263). As such, Ibn Saud “preferred to continue his association with the Americans” as it had “the advantage of assuring the economic development of the country without incurring political liabilities” (Al-Farsy 47). World War II, thus, markedly represented a unique epoch for the House of Saud, characterised by an expansion of diplomatic missions beyond Europe to America (Beling). From Warrior to Diplomat Ibn Saud was considered a warrior of “towering achievements” (Almana 295) – a “truly remarkable man” of discipline and faith, both values which were “essential for success in his harsh desert land” (296). In his biographical text of the late monarch, Almana (296-7) intimately describes how the successes of Ibn Saud’s feats demanded his observance of a rigid daily routine which began at 4.30 a.m. before the morning prayer. The activities of the day revolved around the other prayer times, culminating in the evening prayer before His Majesty went to his bed. In fact, the King made it a rule never to sleep more than six hours out of every twenty-four… This discipline coupled with his natural physical strength enabled His Majesty to maintain a punishing schedule, both in the Court and in the desert, which would have been beyond men who lacked his faith. Ibn Saud was also a highly regarded ruler for his people who was said to have “derived simple joy from giving” (Almana 300). For Almana (303), Ibn Saud’s generous character “allied to a natural compassion and mercy” that he demonstrated even towards his enemies and those who plotted violence against him. While virtuous in their own right, Ibn Saud’s resolute and just nature often translated into an uncompromising policy of ‘utter integrity’ and ‘straightforward candour’ which foreign dignitaries found ‘disconcerting’, particularly ‘glad-handed’ politicians (Almana). While a close relationship between Saudi Arabia and the US steadily developed in the coming decades, following a diplomatic call between Ibn Saud and US President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1945, the initial encounter between the leaders, for example, is emblematic of Ibn Saud’s confronting rhetoric in political contexts: Roosevelt thrust out his hand in greeting, but His Majesty refused to take it, saying, 'How can I shake hands with you when you are assisting the Zionists against us?' Roosevelt was greatly taken aback, but he managed to carry on a conversation with the King during which he promised never to do anything which would prejudice Arab interests. (Almana 308) It was Ibn Saud’s son, King Faisal, however, who inherited and exhibited greater diplomatic expertise – a skill that arguably propelled Saudi Arabia’s international allure, and strengthened the Kingdom’s competence for critical dialogue in the international arena. Interestingly, of Ibn Saud’s 45 sons, Faisal was the only direct descendant of Saudi Arabia’s two founding figures, as discussed earlier – Muhammad ibn Saud from his father’s side, and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab from his mother’s side (Beling). As Rentz (17) wonderfully observes, Faisal personified a commemoration of the “alliance formed more than a century and a half before his birth”. Since young age, Faisal was largely entrusted with the duty of representing his father overseas with matters relating to diplomatic affairs of the state. As loosely depicted in the 2019 historical film, Born a King, a then 13-year-old Faisal was instructed by his father to lead a delegation to London in 1919 for cooperation and discussions following the Allied victory in World War I (fig. 2). This event provided Prince Faisal significant working knowledge of other languages and exposure to political protocols and forums (Beling). Throughout the 1930s and 1940s Faisal assumed the roles of Foreign Minister and Minister of the Interior, where he led national military campaigns, such as the 1934 Saudi-Yemen War, and performed diplomatic services across Europe and the US. During these decades, Faisal also played a significant role in the foundational developmental planning of agricultural and irrigation projects, oil installations, and universities within Saudi Arabia, which were greatly influenced by those he visited in his tours of the US (Beling). The passing of Ibn Saud in 1953 arguably “marked the end of traditional Bedouin-style Arabia” and welcomed a new period of transition into modernisation (Beling 10). Although often criticised for being “too ambitious” and progressive, particularly by religious clergy, Faisal nonetheless remains a revered monarch of modern Saudi history who led the House of Saud away from ultra-conservatism after his father’s death, into a territory characterised by both pioneering programs and institutions of high technology and capital intensity, and social reform initiatives such as the introduction of national television, female inclusion in education, and the abolition of slavery (Beling). Figure 2: Prince Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud’s visit to London in 1919. The Crown Prince, Reinvigorated Nationalism, and the Future of Saudi Arabia The pioneering feats and precedent established by the founding monarchs of Saudi Arabia ultimately led to an unprecedented era of power and affluence for the House of Saud, chiefly evidenced by the monarchy’s entrepreneurial renown since the 2010s. Unlike any other period of modern Saudi history, entrepreneurship has ‘pushed the enveloped’ amongst Saudi communities and youth, “defying old conjectures regarding risk aversion and value creation in the Arab world” (Yusuf & Albanawi 2). Presently, the Saudi government’s effort towards entrepreneurial motivation is one of the key factors that has contributed to a rapid economic growth of the nation, particularly through national self-sufficiency and food independence, and the creation of employment opportunities, including private business ownership (Yusuf & Albanawi). ‘Saudisation’ or ‘Nitaqat’, for example, is an ongoing initiative that aims to increase the level of employment opportunities for Saudi nationals in the private sector, as well as to reduce the government’s reliance on expatriate workers. In 2021, expatriate workers comprised approximately 76.4 percent of the private sector workforce in Saudi Arabia (Puri-Mirza). Notably, initiatives such as Saudisation represent the monarchy’s efforts toward an invigorated nationalist transformation – for Saudis, by Saudis. Spearheading Saudi Arabia’s ‘new nationalism’ is the current reigning monarch, King Salman, alongside his favourite son and protégée, and perhaps one of the most controversial figures of the twenty-first century, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (known colloquially as MBS) (Haykel; Hoffman; Davidson; fig. 3). MBS became a household name and started appearing more frequently within the public eye in 2015 when, at only 29 years of age, he was appointed by his father King Salman as Defence Minister and Secretary-General of the Royal Court. He quickly advanced in rank and position a few short years thereafter – as Crown Prince in 2017 and Prime Minister in 2022 – becoming what most commentators appropriately consider the de facto ruler of present-day Saudi Arabia. Figure 3: Photograph taken of a billboard with MBS (left) and King Salman (right) in the capital city, Riyadh, seen in front of the new financial district currently undergoing construction. The controversy surrounding MBS primarily concerns the ethos of his governance. In both internal and external political affairs of the state, MBS has a reputation for being uncompromising, and “highly motivated and hardworking, if a little combative” (Davidson 320). Holding “concentrated power to an unprecedented degree” not seen before in Saudi history, MBS’s rule has “torn up the old rules of royal family governance … imposed by the collective leadership model that characterised the Saudi regime in the past”, and “side-lined other members of the ruling family” (Davidson 320). This was particularly seen following the unanticipated removal of King Salman’s nephew, Muhammad bin Nayef (‘MBN’), and his subsequent replacement by MBS as Crown Prince in 2017. The event prompted the power father-son duo to dramatically instigate a sweeping ‘anti-corruption purge’ within the Saudi government (Kinninmont). During the crackdown, several hundred members of the House of Saud were arrested and detained within the luxurious five-star Ritz Carlton hotel in Riyadh. Those arrested included major government officials, such as the Minister of Economy and Planning and the prominent son of former King Abdullah and head of the National Guard, Prince Miteb bin Abdullah, who ultimately agreed to pay an out-of-court settlement of around US$1 billion (Kinninmont). Major businesspeople including Prince Waleed bin Talal (the country’s richest man and one of TIME Magazine’s top 100 most influential people of 2008) were also arrested, as well as the head of the MBC media company, Waleed al-Ibrahim, who had previously resisted MBS’s offer to purchase the company (Kinninmont). Certainly, both the motives for the anti-corruption purge and reactions within the extended royal family – including the possibility of mobilisation or retaliation against the current leadership – remain disputed within scholarship, given that politics within the House of Saud is largely hidden to outsiders (Kinninmont). Kinninmont (248) argues that while many of the individuals who were arrested were widely reputed for their involvement in ‘systemic’ corruption (including contractual bribery and nepotism), the charges utilised may also have been, on the other hand, ‘politically selective’, particularly towards opponents of MBS. In any respect, the corruption crackdown was both a political risk and “a populist move at a time of austerity” that enabled MBS to “send certain messages to the country’s traditional elites”. The reconfiguration of power was not limited to the royal family. Rather, King Salman and MBS also boldly confronted the draconian Islamic institution, ‘the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice’, with structural changes which thereby reconfigured the role of the religious clerics and drastically reduced the authority of the notorious ‘religious police’ or mutawa. The mutawa (fig. 4) were assigned the duty of patrolling public spaces and enforcing (or punishing the violation of) strict adherence to Islamic lifestyle and moral conduct (Arab News; Kinninmont; Davidson). Observance of norms and social behaviours under the scrutiny of the mutawa included, but were not limited to, conservative dress code (such as mandating women’s head covering, the hijab), prayer and mosque attendance (including the mandated closure of shops), gender segregation in public spaces, and prohibiting engagement with, or promotion of, ‘Western’ products, activities or customs, such as popular culture texts (music and film), Barbie dolls, celebration of holidays (Christmas, Valentine’s Day), and even the selling of dogs and cats as pets (Sydney Morning Herald; Associated Press). Figure 4: A group of mutawa(usually accompanied by a police officer) patrolling public spaces in Saudi Arabia, identified by their shorter thobes (Arab male dress) and lack of agal (black ring) atop their headdress (shemagh). The sharp curtailment of the powers and privileges of the religious police by King Salman and MBS particularly “came as a major relief for more liberal Saudis unhappy with such restrictions”, not only representing a significant aspect of social and cultural change in the Kingdom but also arguably symbolising the Saudi government’s dedication to renewed nationalism in parallel with the growing momentum of globalisation, modernity, and human rights and social liberalisation trends and movements around the world (Habibi 7). In line with MBS’s championing of Saudi youth and his father’s ‘Vision 2030’ goals, the end of the 2010s was characterised by the introduction of landmark reforms including lifting the prohibition on women driving, introducing cinemas, and allowing women to access government services without the permission of a male ‘guardian’ (Kinninmont). To the surprise of many, tourism, sports, and entertainment events have also been heavily endorsed by the Saudi government, who have sought to diversify Saudi Arabia’s income sources, increase investment and talent, and reduce its dependency on oil in recent years. Many of these events, such as the 2018 Arab Fashion Week, represented a first for Saudi Arabia; other events, such as the debut of the 2018 ‘Diriyah ePrix’, represented the first ever Formula E race in the Middle East – a single-seater motorsport championship involving ‘next generation’ electric cars (Arab News). The 2018 Diriyah ePrix was also accompanied by a three-day complimentary festival headlined by some of the world’s biggest artist including David Guetta, Enrique Iglesias, The Black Eyed Peas, and One Republic (Arab News). In 2024, the entertainment industry remains a key investment for the House of Saud, with the specific aim of persuading its nationals to “do their leisure spending domestically” (Hope). In a recent article published by Vanity Fair, a blossoming ‘bromance’ between MBS and Hollywood actor Johnny Depp has also reportedly culminated in a “seven-figure annual contract” for Depp “to promote Saudi Arabia’s cultural renaissance” (Hope). As Hope accurately conveys, MBS continues to demonstrate that ‘deciphering’ his “increasingly consequential moods, methods, and moves” is no easy feat. What is certain, however, is that the “the traditional pillars of Al-Saud rule” characterised by an archaic system of distribution of power among members of the large royal family, together with an “informal pact with religious clerics and oil wealth”, continue to be weakened by the current leadership (Kinninmont 247). These changes intend to “preserve the power of the monarchy while transforming it dramatically from within” (Kinninmont 247). As such, with the ‘Vision 2030’ development plan successfully underway, government-led actions and policies of the House of Saud demonstrate ambitions for “new authoritarian populism, centring on a discourse of security, technological advancement, youth, social and economic liberalisation, and nationalism” (247). The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, thus, remarkably exemplifies the short-term development achievements and continuing potential of a state under a regime of absolute monarchy; as MBS (fig. 5) asserts in a public statement, “we are confident about the future of Saudi Arabia … . Our people will amaze the world again” (Al-Saud). Figure 5: MBS introducing the launch of the Vision 2030 at a press conference, 2016 References Al-Farsy, Fouad. Saudi Arabia: A Case Study in Development. Routledge, 2023. 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