The Analysis of Driver's Behavior in Non-Signalized Intersection Based on the Game

Abstract

In order to study the driver's decision-making behaviors of the conflict vehicles in non-signalized intersection, according to time refinement, the driver's personality factors and the relative potential factors in the different strategies which affect the driver to make decisions, Based on the dynamic reduplicate game theory, the utility function of the driver's behaviors was built up. As the decision-making behavior by the driver in the process of cross-road, analyzing the different combination of the utility of the driver's decision-making behavior, Nash equilibrium was existed in a single game process, and the driver's optimal decision behaviors in a dynamic game was obtained. The illustration shows that impulse drivers in the decision-making period of time are more willing to choose to accelerate the first strategy; mild drivers prefer to choose acceleration strategy or uniform strategy; cautious drivers prefer to choose to uniform or deceleration strategy.